DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MAR 17 1937 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 18 1937 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE MAR 17 1937

March 10, 1937.

A-M - Judge Moore:

WE - Mr. Dunn:

I think you may be interested in the following excerpts from a personal letter, dated February 17, 1937, which I have just received from Mr. Howland Shaw, our Counselor at Ankara, regarding the present international position of Turkey:

767.00

"A brief, tentative and informal record of impressions as to Turkey's present international position may be of some interest to you.

File DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 18 1937 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

"Two things strike me upon my return from leave. In the first place Turkey's international position is a far more complex sort of affair than it was a year ago or even less than a year ago. Then too Turkey has been very much pulled into the European picture and the policy of being on friendly terms with everybody and tied down to nobody has received various dents. Of course, the change is partly due to the European crisis, but some of it is the price Turkey is paying for raising the Straits and Sancak questions.

"With respect to Turkey's relations to specific countries here are a few thoughts for your consideration.

note 762.67

"The Turks have become decidedly worried over their commercial and financial dependence upon Germany. This was beginning to be the case before I left in October, but it has made great headway in the past three months. Now they are turning to England and Holland to extricate themselves from the German strangle hold and they are talking very differently on the question of finding dollar exchange to do business with us. On the other hand German policy in Turkey seems to be undergoing a change. For years its objective has been commercial but now it appears to be shifting to the political field. In connection with naval conversations with the English, the German Embassy has made representations here against the Montreux Convention and the

favorable

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favorable régime it accords to Russian naval forces.

"This German attitude is perhaps one of the reasons why Dr. Aras did not get very far with Ciano in the matter of Italy's adherence to the Montreux Convention. So far as Turkish sovereignty and the rearmament of the demilitarized zones are concerned Italy is entirely receptive, but the position granted the U.S.S.R. under the Convention is another matter. Furthermore, apparently, the Italians don't want to do anything about Montreux until the League has given de jure recognition to the Ethiopian annexation. It is said Aras told Ciano that de facto recognition had already been generally given and he would help to get de jure recognition at Geneva.

"British influence continues strong. The visit of the Turkish fleet to Malta was a great success, the Brassert business is in apple-pie order. Ismet Pasa is going to London for the Coronation and the London "Financial Times" recently got out a special Turkish supplement which has impressed Ankara mightily. Furthermore, English intervention played a large part in the settlement of the Sancak question.

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"The Russian friendship has cooled considerably - of that fact there can, I think, be little doubt, but my bet is that the cooling is superficial. It is being rumored in Ankara that Souritch is coming back as Amb. to try and improve things. Karakhan hasn't made much of a go of things.

"On the whole and for the present the Turks are reasonably satisfied with the solution of the Sancak question, although, I think, many of them are not so terribly sure they ought to be satisfied. French standing in Turkey which, in recent years, has never been very high, is now a bit worse.

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"The Turks are saying that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Treaty is a good thing as it tends to bring the Bulgarians out of their isolation and

prevent

prevent their tying up with some non-Balkan power. Others contend that the Treaty is due to German or Italian influence and that it is an effort to undermine the Balkan Entente.

"All in all, as you can well see, Turkey has a good many ticklish problems to face in the field of international politics."

Wallace Murray

WSM/GC

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, Turkey, May 19, 1937.

No. 273

DIVISION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS TA
JUL - 8 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Turkey's International Position; May, 1937.

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUN 21 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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To the Field
In U. S. A.
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" " O. N. I.
JUN 17 1937

Assistant Secretary of State
JUN 23 1937
MR. SAYRE

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 10 1937
MR. WELLES

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADVISER
JUN 22 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

767.00/67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 3 1937
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FILED
DEC 10 1937

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Much has happened since the Embassy last attempted over a year ago to formulate a bird's-eye view of Turkey's foreign affairs (Embassy's 926/64, March 8, 1936 and 19/65, April 9, 1936). The principle of friendship with all but alliance with none is still fundamental, but its application has become more difficult. In Europe conflicts have become more acute, lines have been more sharply drawn, and the pressure to take sides has become harder to resist. And Turkey herself--departing in this respect from her policy during the period 1923-35--has taken the initiative in bringing into the arena of international negotiation two important problems: the

militarization

militarization of the Straits and the régime under which the Sancak of Antioch and Alexandretta is in the future to be governed. The first problem Turkey handled with a maximum of correctness and in a short time secured an eminently satisfactory solution and a reputation for being "the good boy" of Europe. The handling of the second has been more aggressive, the negotiations have been protracted and marked by crises, but the result promises to be scarcely less satisfactory. The important point, however, is that Turkey has inevitably paid the price of her initiative in terms of resentments aroused and obligations incurred. Only the future can decide whether the price has been excessive. With this greater complexity of Turkey's international position in mind, let us look at her relations with particular countries.

And first of all the U.S.S.R. That friendship has cooled off appreciably in the past year. Many factors, trivial enough perhaps when separated, but atmosphere-creating when taken together, have contributed to this result. The Soviet attitude at Montreux last summer was disappointing and the tone of the Soviet press distinctly irritating. Soviet support in the Sancak business was most unsatisfactory. Commercial relations, seldom without friction, have recently contributed more than their share of trouble, particularly over the matter of the privileges to be enjoyed by members of the Soviet Trade Delegation. Mr. Karahan's diplomacy was far different from that of his predecessor, Suritz. Mr. Karahan was Armenian; he had trouble with Atatürk shortly after arriving; he tore about Ankara in an expensive runabout; he spoke only English,

and

and that imperfectly; he was constantly taking leave; his personality was cold; he did not get across; and his recall has left no regrets. There is another factor: the U.S.S.R. does not seem today to Turkish leaders quite the promised land of only a few years ago. Latest developments in Moscow and the methods used in bringing them about have been disillusioning. But of course we are writing of surface phenomena. The underlying sense of community of interest is unimpaired. That fact must not be forgotten.

The English friendship is in the center of the stage. The evidence abounds. In the first place, there is the Brassert iron and steel plant contract, financed for a period of eight years by the Export Guarantee Department of the British Treasury. Two and a half million Pounds Sterling are involved. Six weeks ago General Inönü and Sir Percy Loraine journeyed together to lay the cornerstone and the latter in a burst of unexpected oratory likened the sparks from the chimneys of the coming plant to the stars in Heaven. The sojourn of King Edward VIII at Istanbul last summer was deeply pleasing to Atatürk. The visit of the Turkish fleet to Malta was a great success. The Turkish officers were punctilious in their etiquette and the Turkish sailors won the rowing races. The Iş Bank, somewhat to the irritation of the Ottoman Bank, has just established a branch in London. And General Inönü is representing Turkey at the Coronation. He has learned English during the past year, scans the ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS, and will return to Ankara impressed by what he has seen. To be sure, the English stand at Montreux at first puzzled and then irritated the Turks; but English support

during

during the more critical phase of the Sancak negotiations more than made amends. The British-Italian gentlemen's agreement led logically to the Aras-Ciano conversations. In fact, the British attitude of patching without a policy fits in very well with Turkey's principle of friendship with all but alliance with none. The British influence in Turkey at the present time is beneficial. Turkey is getting more perspective and is awakening to the fact that totalitarian ways are not the only ways.

The essential fact in German-Turkish relations is that over Ltq. 43,000,000 are blocked in Germany at the present time. A year ago, the Turks were rejoicing over Germany's purchases in Turkey, often at prices above the world level, and Turkey's purchases in Germany on long-term credits. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National Economy did all they could to favor purchasing in countries with which Turkey had clearing agreements, which in effect meant Germany, until the strain on the Turkish Central Bank became such that the Bank had to take protective measures. Efforts will be made to straighten things out, perhaps by some three-cornered process, and to turn business away from Germany and towards such countries as the United States, England and Holland. But it is a nasty situation and since last October the dangers of German economic domination have been realized by the broader-minded Turkish leaders. German-Turkish relations have since the War been thought of exclusively in economic and financial terms. Nevertheless there has to be recorded a distinctively political move during the present year. The German Ambassador orally and in writing warned the Turkish Government of Germany's historical concern in the question of the Straits, and

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intimated

intimated a general reservation to the Montreux Convention. It was a clumsy move, clumsily executed, and the note was eventually withdrawn; but it may be symptomatic of a new attitude on the part of Germany in Turkey. The able but Prussian-minded ex-assistant of Schacht, Dr. Hans Kroll, who has become Counselor at Ankara, has on at least one occasion spoken of Germany's political aspirations in Turkey in terms of characteristic crudity.

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French-Turkish relations of course have centered around the question of the Sancak. As has often been pointed out, French standing in Turkey has steadily declined. Monsieur Laval's ambiguous attitude in the Ethiopian affair made a very bad impression in Ankara, and Monsieur Kammerer's embassy was in no way calculated to advance French prestige. But the Sancak question is a perfect example of international affairs at their most artificial. It is safe to say that, a year ago, nobody in Turkey was particularly concerned over the fate of the Turks who have since become famous under the name of "Hatay." It was generally known that the Franklin-Bouillon treaty provisions had not been carried out; frontier incidents, especially those provoked by smugglers, were irritating; the activities of anti-Turkish elements were noted; the Syrians abroad who had become Turkish nationals under the Lausanne Treaty were a nuisance; but none of these elements were emotionally tinged. Then came the French-Syrian treaty of last summer and at once an organized campaign began in the Turkish press. So far as Atatürk's rôle in foreign affairs has been known to

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foreigners

foreigners, it has always seemed a sensible one. Whether because of his romancing over Hittite history or whether, as some say, because of sentimental associations formed during the retreat of the Turkish Army before Marshal Allenby which Atatürk commanded, the Sancak question has proved an exception to the rule. In his annual address before the Assembly on November 1, 1936, Atatürk committed himself to an extreme thesis on the Sancak matter and from that time on his personal prestige has been very directly involved and has given his principal advisers serious concern. The solution evolved in principle at Geneva last January was celebrated as a great victory in the press and elsewhere, although in the minds of many Turks there has been a certain amount of questioning and uncertainty. The practical working out of the agreement in principle is still under negotiation, with final results substantially satisfactory to the Turks pretty much assured. Meanwhile the Turks have been expressing indignation over serious raids across the frontier and complaining bitterly of the articles of the Syrian press which, they assert, are French-inspired. The situation of the unhappy French Ambassador, Monsieur Ponsot, has become impossible and it is believed in Ankara that he will be recalled in about a month's time. He is an unimaginative person, thoroughly out of sympathy with Turkey and the Turks, and a good deal at sea in trying to cope with the extremely trying conditions with which his mission has had to contend. He has been called upon for speeches by Atatürk in the early hours of the morning in the drinking pavillion of the Ankara Palace Hotel; and about six weeks ago, in the same

place

place and at somewhat the same time, Atatürk publicly and loudly proclaimed that Monsieur Ponsot had betrayed him. The Ambassador was on leave at the time, but the Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to remonstrate and the incident is understood to be the real reason for Monsieur Ponsot's recall.

The Dodecanese Islands, Leros, Castellorizzo--these are the basic factors in Turkish-Italian relations; but the Turks are sober-minded enough not to allow distrust of Italy to develop into hostility. The careful avoidance of any unnecessary irritation which characterized Turkey's attitude towards Italy during the period of sanctions has been developed along more positive lines. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia having become obvious, the Turks were not slow in finding a pretext for withdrawing their diplomatic mission at Addis Ababa. The Aras-Ciano conversations at Milan served a useful purpose. Dr. Aras undertook to support Italy's claim to recognition of Ethiopian annexation at Geneva, although Ciano was less clear as to what Italy would or would not do with respect to the Montreux Convention, while at the same time recognizing that Turkey's desire to fortify the Straits was natural and proper and not to be construed as a sign of aggressive intentions towards anybody. The conversations certainly cleared the atmosphere, possibly paved the way for Ciano's visit to Belgrade and the conclusion of the Italian-Yugoslav agreement and will perhaps lead to even more tangible results if the Italian Foreign Minister comes to Ankara next October.

Have the recent Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Italian agreements weakened the Balkan Entente or have they

they not? Do these agreements represent an orientation of Yugoslav policy in the direction of the German-Italian axis? These questions are being everywhere asked and variously answered. Looking at the question from the Turkish point of view, there is perhaps a distinction to be drawn. Concerning the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty Turkey was consulted well in advance and expressed satisfaction at the prospect. The treaty went far towards settling a bothersome rivalry and it was desirable that Bulgaria should make an agreement with a member of the Balkan Entente rather than go outside of the peninsula and entangle herself with one of the Great Powers. This was the Turkish reasoning and the chances are all in favor of its sincerity. But the possible implications of the Yugoslav-Italian agreement did arouse a certain uneasiness at Ankara, although in some circles, notably the Soviet press, Dr. Aras has been credited with having had a hand in its making. General Inönü had intended to return Mr. Stoyadinovich's visit of last October by stopping off at Belgrade enroute to the Coronation in London. Instead, he and Dr. Aras made a quite separate and independent visit. The assurances they received were evidently to their liking, for the visit has been declared at Ankara to have been an unqualified success. Certainly the Rumanians and the Greeks are not happy over the agreements, but the Turks are not worried over this unhappiness. Anybody who watched the lonely and pathetic little Mr. Antonesco wandering around at the two Ankara soirées given some six weeks ago in his honor obtained a significant sidelight on how Turkey looks upon Rumania and Turkey has never had much respect for Greece. Turkey however

however still takes the Balkan Entente very seriously. It continues to be one of the bases of Turkish foreign policy and a means of stimulating Turkey's neighbors to adopt her policy of maintaining friendly relations with all the Great Powers without alliance with any of them.

The Eastern Non-Aggression Pact which, if concluded, will be signed by Turkey, Iran, Irak and Afghanistan, and eventually perhaps adhered to by Saudi Arabia, is somewhat to the fore at the present time. The Irak Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Ankara recently and besides furnishing a useful channel for communicating Ankara's friendly sentiments towards the Arabs, particularly in Syria, he did much talking and was much talked to concerning Irak's differences with Iran which have so far held up the signature of the Eastern Pact. These differences are said to be nearer a solution and Dr. Aras has been quoted as saying that the Pact will be signed during his visit to Baghdad and Teheran in June; but Dr. Aras inclines to a somewhat imprecise optimism. Western diplomacy and western newspapers have ascribed more importance to the Pact than has been the case at Ankara, where it has been spoken of as "a good thing" and "a simple recognition of relations and sentiments already existing in point of fact." Great Britain has been represented as being against the Pact, which in view of the British-Turkish friendship does not seem likely; and the same attitude has been attributed to the U.S.S.R., but has been denied.

The relations of the United States with any foreign country are always more important than they appear to be.

A

A coherent American policy towards Turkey as towards most countries is non-existent, but because of what we are and of what we do, we compel attention, and in compelling attention we exert an influence none the less real and important because it is difficult to evaluate. The United States has now become a country of significant social experimentation and change and as such can hardly fail to be of intense interest to a country such as Turkey which has inscribed revolution, or accelerated evolution, in its Constitution as a fundamental principle of State policy. Aside from our example--our news value, so to speak--our chief significance from the Turkish point of view is in the commercial field. We buy more from Turkey than we sell, although exports and imports are tending to equal each other, and the day is probably not far off when the balance of trade will be in favor of the United States. The Turkish Government has just proposed the negotiation of a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement, and in doing so has been animated, not only by the wish to increase exports to the United States but also--and perhaps primarily--to offset the preponderance of the German influence by developing an alternative source of supply in the United States. So strong is this latter desire that there is reason to believe that, if through its realization the balance of American-Turkish trade should change, a serious effort would be made to find ways for avoiding the application of the restrictions provided under present Turkish commercial policies.

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It is always dangerous to draw conclusions from the foreign relations of a country over a short period of time, but in the case of Turkish foreign relations during the

past

past fourteen months there is a tendency which deserves to be noted. The U.S.S.R., Germany and Italy are the principal exponents of totalitarianism. Turkey now looks upon the first with some disillusionment; with the second, there is a very complex and unpleasant commercial-financial tangle; and for the third, the underlying distrust is barely concealed by a discreet and realistic diplomacy. On the other hand, the strongest influence in Turkey today is the British, and the chances are that that influence will become stronger in the future. A few months ago a former member of the KADRO group, whose denunciations of democracy and liberalism have always been scathing, expressed deep interest in the efforts of President Roosevelt in the United States, of Mr. Baldwin in England, and of Monsieur Blum in France, in quite different ways, to readjust democracy to the exigencies of the machine age. A high official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently declared that in his opinion the time was not far off when Turkey would modify her directed economy and relax some of the restrictions on commerce. These remarks do not mean that Turkey is heading in the direction of democracy, which in all probability will continue to be entirely unsuited to Turkish conditions. Nor is it to be anticipated that Turkey will ever again become a dumping ground for any sort of products from the large industrial countries; but a change has begun in Ankara during the past year and this change is in the direction of a less intransigent totalitarianism and a less exuberant and more liberal directed economy.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray

J. V. A. MacMurray

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NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 10 1937
MR. WELLES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 8, 1937.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUN 9 1937
NOTED

S - Mr. Secretary

U - Mr. Welles

767.00/67

The attached despatch of Mr. Shaw, Counselor of Embassy at Istanbul, on the international position of Turkey is an unusually fine piece of political reporting. A resumé follows.

General Policy: The principle of "friendship with all but alliance with none" is still fundamental in Turkish foreign policy but its application has become more difficult recently due to (1) the sharper drawing of lines in the European political situation and (2) Turkey's taking the initiative in bringing into the arena of international negotiation the problems of the Straits and the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

U. S. S. R.: Friendship has cooled off appreciably of late between the U. S. S. R. and Turkey due to (1) the unsympathetic Soviet attitude regarding the Straits and Sanjak, (2) commercial friction, (3) personal unpopularity of the Russian Ambassador and (4) disillusionment of Turkey as regards recent developments in the Soviet Union. Basically, however, the two countries have a natural community of interests which remains unimpaired.

Great

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Great Britain: British friendship has been the outstanding development in the international relations of Turkey during the past year. Specific evidences of this improved relationship abound, as, for example, the visit of King Edward VIII last summer, the awarding of an important contract to a British firm for the erection of an iron and steel mill, a courtesy visit of the Turkish fleet to Malta, British support of the Turkish position on the Straits question, and agreement of British and Turkish policies with regard to Italy.

Germany: The extensive purchases of Turkish goods by Germany, which was once a cause of such satisfaction in Turkey, has now become an acute problem due to the accumulation of blocked Turkish credits in Germany. In their attempts to extricate themselves from this difficult situation, the Turks are turning away from Germany towards such countries as the United States, England and Holland. Ill-concealed German political aspirations in Turkey are also said to be resented by the Turks.

France: French standing in Turkey, which was far from high in the first place, dropped still further during the past year as a result of the dispute over the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

Italy: The Italian-owned Dodecanese Islands are, because of their close proximity to the Turkish coastline,

the

the basic factors in Turkish-Italian relations. The Turks are, however, sober-minded enough not to allow distrust of Italy to develop into hostility.

The Balkans: Turkey still takes the Balkan Entente very seriously as a means of stimulating member countries to adhere to the Turkish policy of maintaining friendly relations with all great powers but alliance with none. In this connection Turkey seems to entertain no apprehension with regard to the recent improvement of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia.

770.00

Eastern Non-Agression Pact: It is expected that this Pact, which has been initialed by Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan and to which Saudi Arabia may adhere, will be signed in the near future on the occasion of a visit which the Turkish Foreign Minister plans to make to Teheran. Turkey does not seem to be particularly interested in the Pact, however, presumably because the Pact is understood to be merely a recognition of an already existing situation.

167.902/12 Non aggression

United States: "Both because of what we are and what we do, we compel attention, and in compelling attention we exert an influence none the less real and important because it is difficult to evaluate."

Aside from our example in the field of social experimentation and economic change, our chief significance from the Turkish point of view is in the economic field, particularly in view of the fact that we buy more from Turkey than

we

we sell. The Turkish Government has just proposed to us the negotiation of a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement and in so doing has been animated by the desire not only to increase Turkish exports to this country, but also, and perhaps primarily, to offset German commercial predominance.

Conclusion: During the past year, a marked tendency away from countries devoted to the totalitarian principle has been noticeable in Turkish foreign relations. This does not mean that Turkey is heading in the direction of democracy or that it will again become a dumping ground for large industrial countries. It is a change, however, "in the direction of a less intransigent totalitarianism and a less exuberant and more liberal directed economy."

Wallace Murray

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NE RAH/EG

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/68

SEE 767.71/16 FOR #357

FROM Rumania (Harrison) DATED June 2, 1937
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Turkish foreign policy.

Conversation with the Turkish Minister to Rumania who explained -.

Wi

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, Turkey, June 25, 1937.

No. 287

Subject: Address by the Prime Minister, General Ismet Inönü, before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on June 14, 1937.

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 6 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PM 1 47
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
1937

To the Field
In U. S. A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 14 1937
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.00

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith an English translation (made from the official French version) of an address delivered before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on June 14, 1937, by the Prime Minister, General Ismet Inönü. It was made a few days after the return of the Prime Minister from the Coronation at London and though the immediate occasion was the debate on the budget this forms the subject matter of only the last few paragraphs of the speech, the major portions being devoted to Turkey's foreign relations and to some internal disturbances in the Vilayet of Tunceli, formerly called Dersim. The last-mentioned trouble is being described in 967.00/3039

another

FILED
AUG 9 - 1937

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N/C

another despatch from this Embassy and my comments here will therefore be confined to the Prime Minister's discussion of Turkish foreign relations.

The attention which the Prime Minister gave to relations with Soviet Russia was most conspicuous. He seemed to take special pains to inform the world that Turco-Soviet relations were never better than at present. He may have done this in order to counteract the reports being circulated in Turkey that the Russians have aided the revolt in the Turkish Vilayet of Tunceli and, perhaps in preparing the way for the forthcoming visit to Moscow of Dr. Aras, the Foreign Minister, to show the Soviet Government that he does not consider it responsible; or, there may be more below the surface than meets the eye and there may be truth in the rumors that a certain coolness has existed, and perhaps still does exist, between the two countries. The recent series of trials in Russia has created a certain amount of bewilderment among the Turkish friends of the Soviets, as well as lowered the diplomatic and military prestige of Russia in the eyes of the Turks. There must also be considered the reaction upon Turco-Soviet relations of the present cooperation between Turkey and Great Britain in international affairs.

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After touching upon the subjects of Turkey's relations to the neighboring countries of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan the Prime Minister speaks of the great friendship and confidence existing between Turkey and Great Britain as was revealed to him on his recent visit to that country. He expresses the hope that everything

will

will go well with Italian-Turkish relations. In outlining the recent difficulties with France over the Sanjak, he states that this question has now been settled through the help of the League of Nations and promises that Turkey will observe the treaties which she has signed. He adds a warning note to Turkish trouble makers as well as to the Syrians. He touches upon Balkan politics and terminates that portion of his address devoted to foreign relations by reaffirming Turkish loyalty to the League of Nations and to the cause of peace. No mention is made of Germany in the entire address, - an omission which is significant in view of Turkey's commercial relations with Germany and the fact that a mission is departing this week for Berlin to negotiate a new commercial treaty.

Respectfully yours,

G. Howland Shaw.

G. Howland Shaw,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

1/ - Translation of address by General Ismet Inönü, Prime Minister, before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on June 14, 1937.

Copies sent to London, Moscow, Beirut.

710/803

SWW:mej

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 287 of June 25, 1937, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

TRANSLATION

ADDRESS BY GENERAL ISMET INÖNÜ BEFORE THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON JUNE 14, 1937.

Honorable Colleagues:

On this day when you are about to interrupt your fruitful labors, I consider it my duty to deliver to your high Assembly a succinct summary of the internal and foreign policies of the Government.

If after this summary you consider that we are worthy of your high approval and encouragement, I will ask for a vote of confidence (Prolonged applause).

As a beginning I will endeavor to elucidate, as clearly as possible and hiding nothing, all of our relations having to do with our foreign policy as it now exists. After having separately reviewed our relations with each one of our neighbors, I will explain the bases of our foreign policy in general.

Our relations with the Soviet Union are friendly and sincere. This friendship has even been reanimated by a new cordiality during recent weeks (Cheers). For those who believed and supposed that on the contrary during the immediate past there existed a coolness between ourselves and the Soviets, it will perhaps be astonishing that I make such a precise and clear statement. My recent interviews with Mr. Litvinov as well as our contacts with the new Soviet Ambassador upon his arrival at Ankara have caused us to realize that the friendly ties which unite our two countries are appreciated by both at their correct value (Cheers).

Those persons who suppose that a certain coolness has marked our relations with the Soviets are persons who have not paid sufficient attention to the proofs which have thus far been realized and who do not yet clearly understand the nature of our policy.

The independence of our policy, the peculiarities of our diplomatic and geographic position impose upon us and will always impose upon us the need of undertaking certain activities which are peculiar to ourselves. This peculiarity has never caused and will never cause a contradiction of our engagements, of our existing friendships and our relations with the Soviets, for whom we have had a mutual esteem since the first days, and with whom our relations have been animated by a close friendship (Cheers). The Turco-Soviet friendship, such as it has been agreed upon, and such as we have been led to define it, will persist as a durable element in the policy of our two countries (Cheers). I believe that my present declarations will completely dissipate any and all

doubts

doubts which have been or may be raised in our minds on the subject of the good relations and the sincere friendship of our two countries. I am convinced that in the present state of world politics it will be to the advantage of international interests, and of the principles of peace, to perpetuate on solid foundations the friendship which exists between our two countries.

My colleague Dr. Aras, with an authority ceded to him today by your favor and confidence, will shortly visit Baghdad, Teheran and Moscow (Applause).

Our relations with Iraq are sincere and friendly. Public opinion in this country has produced happy manifestations of this fact on many occasions. This country appreciates entirely and will always appreciate Iraq's will to assume, and wisdom in assuring, its development and progress and in maintaining good relations with us.

Our deeply rooted friendly relations with Iran, and our feeling of confidence in that country, are greatly enforced by the important treaties which have recently received the approval of the Grand National Assembly. The important steps towards progress which Iran has realized have always provoked admiration in the Turkish people and this country has always claimed, and will continue to do so with esteem and sympathy, the development of Turco-Iranian relations in an atmosphere of close fraternity (Applause).

I should have liked that my colleague Dr. Aras, in the course of his trip, undertake a journey to Kabul and that he deliver on the spot proof of our friendly feeling. Material considerations, however, will not permit him to extend his trip on this occasion to Kabul. I am happy if my words have given the high Assembly an occasion to manifest its friendly sentiments towards the Afghan people (Applause). There is no doubt but that our Minister for Foreign Affairs will seize the first opportunity to visit our Afghan friends at Kabul.

I am happy to declare that our relations with Great Britain are based upon real friendship and confidence.

While I was in England I had proof of the fact that the most authoritative personalities of the English nation were sincerely friendly to my country and that the most authoritative statesmen showed that they were happy for me to carry back to my own country the sincere and cordially friendly sentiments which England entertains towards Turkey (Applause). Confidence in and sympathy with our country was not limited only to official circles but was manifest also among private individuals. The path of action which England follows in the interest of peace entirely conforms to our own ideas. The sentiments of confidence existing between our two countries will be most useful in furthering the reciprocal development of our relations and will be a valuable factor in contributing to the cause of peace and to an atmosphere of security.

Our

Our political relations with Italy are very good. Our economic relations are developing. Our sincere hope is that our relations with Italy may be of the best. Our sincere wish is to see a disappearance of misunderstandings in the Mediterranean and, after all differences between States have been discarded, to witness an atmosphere of good relations dominating the foreign policies of all countries. Our country knows full well, as does all the world, that security and stability in the Mediterranean constitute for us a most precious objective (Cheers). This country will accord its full support to any measures which may cause and assure security and stability in the Mediterranean.

Concerning the salutary and happy development of our relations with France, our colleague the Foreign Minister and previous speakers have all had the opportunity of addressing you concerning the Sanjak treaties.

I have taken up on the spot, and in the clearest manner, with those who are primarily responsible for the foreign policy of France, the essential subjects of security and high policy between Turkey and France. I am happy to declare that I was able to confirm among the responsible statesmen of France, in the French Parliament, in French public opinion and among all notable personalities of France, the existence of a serious desire to nourish and maintain good relations towards Turkey. (Applause). The Sanjak question recently reared its head between France and ourselves, and certain incidents were produced which affected the security of the frontier. The question of the Sanjak has been definitely settled by the Council of the League of Nations and by the treaties which you have ratified today. In my opinion the greatest value of the result achieved by the settlement of the Hatay question is found in the certainty which exists in our minds that this matter has come to a happy end. Treaties concerning the disposal of international problems only acquire value if their provisions are accepted as binding, not only by the Governments of the country concerned but also in the minds of the inhabitants of those countries. Turkey accepts as binding the manner in which the Hatay problem has been disposed of.

Previous speakers have found several reasons, arising from the provisions of the treaties, for criticizing the Government, but as your high Assembly, all the nation, and all the world must realize, and as all previous speakers have agreed to be the case, the essential consideration is the frank and loyal application of the principles which we have placed on paper. In short we, Turkey, will claim nothing more than the effective and honest putting into force of the arrangement arrived at by the League of Nations (Applause).

The loyal carrying out of treaties depends more than on anything else upon the good will of the signatories. I have already described to you the friendly atmosphere

which exists between Turkey and France, and the sincerity with whichthese relations are viewed by responsible French statesmen. Consequently, we possess at this time all imaginable elements necessary for the loyal application of the treaties which we have concluded concerning the Hatay.

We notice that certain politicians -- I seek to find and to apply the least harsh term -- who are ignorant of the situation, or who for one reason or another seek to complicate the situation, apparently are not happy as a result of the decision which the League of Nations has taken, and are endeavoring to disturb the peace. Indications in this sense have come to us not only with respect to speakers in your high Assembly but also in respect to others in the interior of our country. In my opinion it will be useful, in regaining our tranquillity in this regard, to bear in mind certain points: for the moment it is incumbent upon France to undertake the execution of the treaties. But by virtue of the treaty by means of which we commit ourselves today, it is incumbent upon Turkey and France to safeguard the integrity of the Hatay by any and all means. Turkey's responsibility is undeniable. We must therefore be sure that these treaties will be kept in effect by the force and the good will of the interested parties and, finally, if all other means fail and if political agents provocateurs threaten the security of these international acts, we will not hesitate, if need be, to have recourse to the League of Nations. The situation of the Hatay, and the honest assurance of security as envisaged in the principles established by the League of Nations, are under the protection and the collective guaranty of as many peoples as there are members of the League of Nations. I hope that in the words which I speak with calm there may be a sufficient number of affirmations to assure the operation at all costs, and in all honesty, of the accord concluded in respect to the Hatay. Furthermore, our nation is imbued with sympathy and a real cordiality for the people of Syria. I have had many valuable opportunities to profit by an observation of the feelings of Turks towards the independence of Syria, but I do not feel justified in saying that I find at the present time sufficient encouragement in the circumstances to speak with any warmth on this subject. I am convinced, nevertheless, that the two countries will finish by forcing their respective politicians to recognize their real interests (Applause).

Incidents which have occurred on the Turco-Syrian frontier have occasioned certain exchanges of correspondence. These questions were speedily solved. There is no difference of opinion in the final analysis in either country, in so far as maintenance of the security of the border is concerned. It is merely a question of seeing that it does exist, and to this end we, in conjunction with the statesmen of France, have decided mutually to exert our most serious efforts. In brief, I am particularly pleased to hope, and to express this hope before the Grand National

Assembly,

Assembly, that as a result of a happy application of the treaties in question a new era of development will be begun and a new atmosphere of great security will be apparent in our relations with France.

In our relations with the Balkan States there exists hardly any phase which is not known to the entire nation. Those four States and ourselves are allied among ourselves in the name of peace by public treaties. Recently Dr. Aras and myself have had, both together and separately, the joy of visiting the capitals of our Balkan Allies. The sympathy and cordiality manifested by our allies towards our country were of sufficient ardor to attract the attention of the whole world. Our country has replied with the same ardor to the friendly manifestations of Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania (Applause).

The distinct policies of the four Balkan states, the manifestations of which we can observe from time to time, as a result of the different nature of their frontiers, give rise to propaganda which produces the impression that their position as regards their obligations devolving from the Balkan Pact diminish or lessen. We notice it but you should not believe it. We understand, as a result of most intimate contacts, that the Balkan states are sincere and perseverant in the pursuance of the ideal of peace which unites them (ovations).

As regards our neighbor Bulgaria we have learned, -- I had the honor to speak to you about it on one or two previous occasions, -- from most authoritative sources of the good intentions which that country shows with a view to maintaining peace in the Balkans and to developing good relations with her other neighbors.

Bulgaria is united with Yugoslavia by a special treaty in the same manner in which she is united with us by a special treaty. She has stated that she intends to establish like relations with Greece and Rumania. Turkey can but encourage Bulgaria in her endeavors and try to facilitate them as much as she can.

There is no doubt that the establishment of an atmosphere of warm friendship in the Balkans between Bulgaria and her other neighbors, and the desire of all the Balkan states -- as they claim it -- to follow the path of a sincere and well meaning amity are aspirations which fill us with joy and which contribute to the establishment of peace in Europe.

I shall not, as regards our relations with Bulgaria, enter at present into details -- the subjects of particular interest to the Turkish nations being well known. We have found that it is to our interest, in our relations, to give reciprocal attention to the sensitive points and to develop good friendship. You realize that all the principles as well as all the stages of verbal intercourse between the states are satisfactory and well-advanced. We consider that it is in the interest of the two countries to apply them/and we are so doing.
well

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I would also like to speak to you of our point of view as regards the League of Nations.

Lately the strength as well as the weakness of this institution have been exaggerated. Those who believed in its strength were expecting that it should settle easily and in an effective manner great problems and important questions. This is an utopia. Those who set forth its weakness believe that it is of no utility and that it is unable to give any guarantee whatsoever to the nations. This indicates failure to see the reality in its true proportions.

The League of Nations finds itself today in a state of great weakness due to the fact that it is deprived of the activity of states which de jure and de facto have not joined it. There is no doubt that if the states which have not joined the League of Nations would give their valuable cooperation to those participating in the League of Nations, the great authority which this institution exercises on the ideal of International Peace would be greatly strengthened and would assume its ideal form. This is our wish. However, even in its actual state its importance is far from being small. It has great importance and value. The fact that so many nations declare that they are united in the pursuance of a determined goal of peace, constitutes a valuable assistance to all the world, to humanity: (Applause). It would be likewise unwise to disregard that responsible statesmen of so many nations meet, see each other periodically, understand one another, and finally certain valuable experiences show that the League of Nations is a precious means for the study of international relations and, in certain circumstances, one liable to find good remedies. Furthermore, the ideal set up by the League of Nations for international peace is an ideal in the materialization of which it is desirable that all the world should contribute its cooperation.

I show by what I have said that, after having weighed all that had been advanced in favor and against the League of Nations, we are firmly convinced that it is a useful institution and wish to follow a policy which is in accordance with its principles.

While speaking, at the beginning of my exposé, of our political relations I have examined separately our relations with our neighbors.

Our relations with non-neighborly states are likewise good and friendly. We have no essential differences with any country.

Having stated this fact with satisfaction, I must say that all the world is actively interested in the question of peace and that all the nations are searching

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for measures necessary to establish on sound foundations the conduct of international peace. Solutions are being sought for its maintenance and for its establishment on a solid basis -- but have not as yet been found. I know that our country is most earnestly desiring peace, but it is necessary that it should know and always remember that international peace is not as yet resting on solid foundations. This is reason why I am telling you about it.

We are sincere and true adepts of the cause of peace. We are working with our own means in the field of our activity for the safeguard of international peace.

Turkey's safety and interests depend on peace, and we wish that the latter should always be safeguarded. I wish that this attitude be considered as our political conception. We consider it against our interests and our wellbeing that international peace should be broken even in places remote from Turkey and situated far from our frontiers (Applause). We do not seek the security of our country in conflicts between any other two countries (Applause). This is an essential point. We are convinced that the security of our country may very well be conciliated with the good and sincere relationships between other countries and even be insured thereby (Applause). This is the reason why we never become involved in any dispute or conflict between two countries. We wish to see the straightening out of such disputes. We wish that there should never arise some conflict or dispute between any country whatsoever. On the contrary, we wish that such estrangements and frictions among countries should be suppressed.

These are the essential considerations, the moral reasons and factors which preside over our policy in the task which we accomplish as an important member and as a strong people in the midst of the community of nations.

I would like now to say to you some words about our domestic policy.

As regards our internal policy I wish to inform public opinion from the height of this platform concerning one question only, - the basic elements of the events in the Vilayet of Tunceli, formerly called Dersim, and of the present conditions in that vilayet.

As your High Assembly is aware, the Government has been applying for the last two years in the Tunceli region a special program of reforms. This program carries details of a vast plan of activity destined to civilize this region with every means and by special provisions. Certain chiefs, until now happy and strong in their opposition to the law, did not welcome these reforms. They wanted to resist and to oppose the program. This made it necessary for us -- I cannot indicate to you the exact date -- to take special measures of a military order some time at

the

the end of March or the beginning of April. We were considering the question: what should we do in this region which resists and opposes the program of reforms of the Government? Formerly, in the case of an opposition, a considerable punitive force used to be sent to the affected region and, following a severe repression, was recalled. We called them "torrential expeditions". But we have arrived at the conviction that it is of no avail to proceed with considerable forces and to pass like a torrent whenever an incident takes place in some part of the country. We consider it our primordial duty to pursue the carrying out of our program -- after having broken down the resistance of those who oppose themselves against it -- as if nothing whatsoever had happened.

This now is the present situation: the police and governmental authority has been completely established. The proposed measures as regards the program of reforms are being applied unceasingly. We are constructing roads, founding schools and establishing police stations (karakols). These works have now been taken up again in those parts where they had to be interrupted for one or two months.

I have heard that some people think that in the course of these operations and activities serious encounters have taken place and that up to the present there have been heavy losses. I shall, therefore, tell you exactly the operations which have taken place until now, that is for three months, and give you the figures of the losses sustained in the course of these three months. According to the report which I have received today, our losses in gendarmes, soldiers and guards amount to 13 dead and 18 wounded, one of the latter being an officer, a lieutenant. We deplore these losses and we have seen that they have brought great affliction to your High Assembly. But, in the light of exaggerated publicity, I desire to invite your attention to the fact that the sacrifices which we were obliged to make are not too extreme if we consider the importance of the events and of the task which has been accomplished.

I repeat again that today the Government and the gendarmerie are completely masters of the situation. A sufficient military force is being kept there in readiness. The carrying out of the program of reforms is being continued. I state before your High Assembly and I wish that the citizens of that region as well as the entire country should know that the Government of the Republic is not applying the program of reforms as a thing of luxury, a whim (Ovations). Whatever the difficulties may be that it will encounter, no matter what number of years will be needed to carry it out, we shall apply this program be it winter or summer (Long Applause).

Whenever

Whenever the Grand National Assembly is passing a resolution, it is not in our principles or in our power to withdraw in the face of certain oppositions or difficulties. Our attitude will be the same also in this instance. We shall not fail to apply our program and the resolution of the Grand National Assembly (Applause). I consider that the formal cognizance of this fact will facilitate the task of all of us just as it will convince the foolish chiefs that the only issue lies in seeking salvation in the arms of the Government which is as strong as it is just and affectionate.

You see very well that I have clearly exposed to you all the questions. The problems figuring on the order of the day of your High Assembly constitute each a vivid example setting forth the general activity of the Government.

We are following a policy of reedification. We take advantage of every opportunity to lower the taxes. The measures, taken with a view to reducing taxes, which we have been applying for several years as a financial policy have so far yielded positive results. We have within a few years found means to compensate the balance resulting from tax reduction. We hope to be able to witness a further progress in the prosperity of our country in connection with the reduction in the tax on oil and others.

We are, as regards the fiscal reform, following unfalteringly a policy of tax reduction in all items of taxation which make such an application possible. (Applause).

In the course of the debates on the budget, the Minister of Finance communicated to you his expectations to carry over to the new fiscal year a treasury statement amounting to some 10 million Turkish Pounds. The accounts as checked up at the beginning of the month of June showed that the forecast of the Minister of Finance had materialized in such a manner as to show an excess. Thus according to the information furnished me we have started the current fiscal year with a treasury statement amounting to 11,500,000 Turkish Pounds (Ovations).

A good and solid budget constitutes the essential principle generating confidence in all the activities of the country. In order to prove the solidity of the data on which the new budget has been based, it will be sufficient for me to tell you that the budget has been voted by your High Assembly in an amount of 231 million Turkish Pounds; but, according to the provisional accounts at the close of the year, the entries in 1936 exceeded 241 million Turkish pounds (Applause). You will therefore realize that the surplus in the budget which you have just approved has been actually built up during the past year. I think that this can be considered as a concrete proof of the fact that the policy adopted in the economic life of the country has been successful and that the country is progressing continually on the path

towards

towards development.

It has been my wish to lay down in the present exposé succinctly and separately the general lines of our foreign and interior policy.

We intend to follow with conviction these essential lines of our policy in regard to which you have been informed in a most ample manner during the debates in connection with the budget.

We request you to show us that you approve and encourage us in this sense by giving us your highly valued vote (Ovations, Long Applause).

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767.00 70

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE 867.00/3048 FOR #370

FROM Turkey ( Kelley ) DATED Oct.11, 1937

TO

NAME

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING: Attitude of President Ataturk with respect to policing of the Mediterranean and his desire to play a more independent role in European politics.

Wi

767.00/70

N/HC

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE 867.415/20 FOR #389

FROM Turkey ( Kelley ) DATED Oct.30, 1937
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

767.00/71

REGARDING:

Attendance by President Ataturk of the 14th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic during which he commented upon the international political situation and stressed his friendship for the British.

Wi

Ankara, Turkey,

October 30, 1937.

No. 389

SUBJECT: Celebration of the 14th Anniversary of the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

867.415/20

CONFIDENTIAL

767.00

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on October 29th the Republic of Turkey celebrated the 14th anniversary of its proclamation of independence. At Ankara there was the usual reception at noon when the President first received the deputies and various Turkish officials, and afterwards the diplomatic corps. In the afternoon there was a parade which was preceded by an airplane demonstration in which 140 planes took part. In the

parade

parade itself, first place was given to the Boy and Girl Scout organizations and school children. These were followed by three regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and various mechanized units, of which the anti-aircraft guns showed a conspicuous increase in comparison with last year. In the evening a large Ball, at which 4,000 people were present, was given in the Exposition Building. The Ball was honored with the presence of President Atatürk who, shortly before midnight, entered the room where there was a special buffet for the diplomatic corps and, after seating himself, summoned various persons to join his circle, and kept a small group in conversation until 7:30 a. m.

On the President's right, during these eight hours of conversation, was M. Tatarescu, the Rumanian Prime Minister, and on his left sat Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador. The others who were in the group during the whole period were M. Samiy, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran; Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army; Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs; Celal Bayar, the Turkish Prime Minister; and M. Ponsot, the French Ambassador. Others were present during shorter periods.

*Most of the talking was done by Atatürk, who led the discussion of a great variety of topics, ranging from trivialities to matters of international political importance.

*This account of the conversation is based chiefly upon a report made by Major Williamson, Military Attaché of this Embassy, who, upon invitation, sat in with the group from about 3:00 a. m. on.

importance. A great deal of the discussion was concerned with the ways and means of assuring international peace. On several occasions during the evening Atatürk touched the arm of the British Ambassador and stated to those present: "This is my friend". On one of these occasions he turned next to the French Ambassador and said, "You may also be my friend if you wish", and added that "the friends of my friends are my friends". The above phrases indicate what seems to have been the main theme of Atatürk's conversation regarding the world political situation: cordial approval of British foreign policy and an invitation to France to become a friend of Turkey by following the British lead in international affairs. At one point he said to the French Ambassador that they had had differences over the Hatay question but that these were now settled in principle and more important questions must be taken up. The French Ambassador stated that all the details of the Hatay problem would be solved in about six months' time, but Atatürk interrupted to say that they must be solved in a month and a half.

It is worthy of particular note that neither Germany, Italy, nor the Soviet Union was mentioned during the entire conversation and that no representatives from any of these countries was invited to join the President's circle. Frequent references, however, were made by Atatürk to his high regard for his Balkan allies and his eastern allies, the Rumanian Prime Minister and the Iranian Foreign Minister being representatives in the group of the two ententes. Atatürk requested contributions to the conversation principally from the British and French Ambassadors.

The

The Iranian Foreign Minister and the Turkish Prime Minister said nothing. On one occasion the Rumanian Premier was asked to express an opinion on a matter and launched forth in a statement in which he mentioned the Little Entente. Ataturk then suggested that the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente might be merged into one.

Towards morning Ataturk called for some peasant dancers who gave an exhibition of their art, and at 7:30 a. m. the President suddenly left the building.

Respectfully yours,

Robert F. Kelley,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Copies sent to Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, Prague, Teheran, London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Moscow.

841.5

SWW:mcj

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/72

SEE 711.00111 Armament Control /897 FOR Tel. # 18 7pm
Military Secrets

FROM Turkey ( Kelley ) DATED Nov.11.1937.
NAME

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING: Relations-General. Turkey .

Turkish Government is seeking the preservation of peace in southeastern Europe by remaining aloof from any tie up with either of the conflicting groups in Europe and, collaborating with neighboring peace-loving countries. Turkish Government considers that the completion of its program of armament,particularly in respect to military aviation a matter of supreme national importance because of the present international situation in Europe.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1937 NOV 30 PM 2 43

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Ankara, Turkey,

No. 423

November 16, 1937.

Subject: Extracts from Speeches of President Atatürk and Celal Bayar, before the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1937, and November 8, respectively.

767.00/73

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 1 1937

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

867.5151/68

With reference to my despatch No. 397 of November 2, 1937, transmitting an extract from President Atatürk's address to the Grand National Assembly in which he mentioned the Hatay question, I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of the entire portion of his address dealing with foreign affairs. There is also transmitted a translation of that part of the address of Celal Bayar, Prime Minister, before the Grand National Assembly on November 8, 1937, which had to do with foreign affairs.

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In addition to the Hatay question it will be noted that the President mentioned Turkey's attachment to the League of Nations and her collaboration with the countries associated

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associated in the Saadabad Pact and with her neighbors in the Balkans, as well as the conclusion of commercial arrangements with various countries, in particular with France, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union.

The most interesting remark made by the Prime Minister in that portion of his speech having to do with foreign affairs was that regulations will be issued so that the organizations abroad of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy will in the future coordinate to a greater extent than formerly their work relative to the development of foreign commerce.

Respectfully yours,

Robert F. Kelley

Robert F. Kelley,
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

Enclosures:

1/ Extract from Speech of President Atatürk.
2/ Extract from Speech of Prime Minister, Celal Bayar.

710
RFK/rs

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 423 of
November 16, 1937, from the Embassy at Ankara.

SOURCE: Circular from the
Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.

FULL TRANSLATION

Extract from Address Delivered by President Kâmal Atatürk before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1937, Containing a Discussion of Foreign Affairs.

During the year which has just come to a close our foreign policy has developed further in the direction of peace and international cooperation, showing the permanence in the course which we follow.

During the difficult phases which the League of Nations has traversed the Government of the Republic, in showing its attachment to this international institution in all of its aspects, has continued along the road which conforms most to the ideal of peace. You know the developments in the Hatay question, which is for us a great national cause.

The negotiations which took place under the noble direction of the League of Nations ended by the signature and by the approval of agreements which satisfy the aim followed by us with the purpose of giving the population of the Hatay the happy and independent administration which it merits.

Little time has passed since the new régime of the Hatay began to function.

It is not possible to doubt that France, with whom we have collaborated in the most friendly spirit, will proceed to apply in good faith the new régime in a manner which will realize the desired goal.

I am convinced that the progress of the Hatay affair in the right direction will be at the same time an essential step and a necessary factor for the development of French-Turkish relations in the desired sense.

Our Balkan policy, in continuing to assure the most happy collaboration, does not cease to advance with results always more fruitful along the path of peace which has been traced for it. The policy of friendship and conciliation which the Government of the Republic pursues in the East has just received a new support and has taken a great step; the Four-Power Pact which we have signed at Saadabad with our friends of Afghanistan, Irak and Iran, is one of the instruments of peace which deserves to be pointed out with the greatest satisfaction.

We

We are persuaded that the collaboration of the governments of the Powers grouped about this Pact, who seek the same end and sincerely desire their development in peace, will in the future also produce happy results.

A stability and a harmonious development in the relations of the Government of the Republic with its neighbors as well as with other States, great and small, are clearly manifest.

Every time that an appeal comes, from anywhere, in favor of peace, Turkey has welcomed it with eagerness and has never refused her assistance.

The Government of the Republic has associated itself in the fullest spirit with the measures which it has been necessary to take in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea in connection with the events in Spain.

I can equally emphasize with satisfaction that the good relations, which I pointed out last year, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Black Sea as well as in the Balkans and in the Near East have continued in the same manner.

Reciprocal visits have taken place since last year between the eminent leaders of the friendly and allied Powers and our statesmen, and these visits have given an opportunity to show our friendships.

During the course of this year the Government has settled its commercial relations with various states by concluding conventions and accords conforming to the economic structure of the country.

Among these I wish to point out in particular the agreements and important commercial arrangements concluded with France, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. There is need to regulate the activity of our organizations abroad in such a way as to make each one of them an auxiliary organ capable of enlarging the scope of the knowledge and information of our departments, which are engaged in the fight for our economic development.

To explain briefly the distinctive character of our foreign policy I can say that we do not swerve from the course and the political aims which we have laid out for ourselves.

In spite of the continual changes which have come about these last years in international relations we remain, in the midst of these disturbances, animated with pacific sentiments, faithful to our reciprocal friendships and we work, always having in mind the international situation and our duty, in a spirit suitable for enlarging the character and the circle of these friendships.

I have the conviction that the best advice that I can give to the Government is to continue to work diligently in this direction.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 423 of
November 16, 1937, from the Embassy at Ankara.

SOURCE: Bulletin of the
Anatolian Agency.

FULL TRANSLATION

Extract from the Address Delivered by Celal Bayar, Turkish Prime Minister, before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 8, 1937.

Gentlemen:

You know the Republic's foreign policy which has never changed. This policy which finds its basis in the high will and high directives of Atatürk, who has outlined the course to follow, will continue along the same road of peace, friendship, and vigilance.

Our principal task will be to respect, as always, our friendships and our reciprocal engagements and to watch over the harmonious development of our circle of friendships.

The greatest care and attention will be given to observing the points which the Chief has indicated in his address.

Regulations will be drawn up this year after consultation with the interested administrations to permit our foreign organization to work more effectively in our struggle for economic improvement.

We will see that all our embassies and consulates are equipped to meet the needs of foreign commerce and that they work consistently. The relations between the foreign commerce organization of the Ministry of Economy and that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be regulated. The important task which is incumbent upon our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the development of foreign commerce, will be pursued and accomplished with a sure hand, giving it an importance equal to its mission with regard to diplomatic relations.

Our attachment to the League of Nations constitutes one of the supports of our foreign policy and is a natural consequence of this policy. In order that this great institution may fulfill the mission which one expects from it it ought to adapt itself to the exigencies of the times and to obtain the necessary practical results from the experience which it has had. Our Government will try to facilitate, as much as it can, the efforts which will be made to this end.

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/74

SEE 711.00111 Armament Control / 924 FOR Desp. # 419
Military Secrets

FROM Turkey ( Kelley ) DATED Nov.15.1937.
NAME

799/

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING: Turkish Foreign Policy.

Memorandum of conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs which exposes Turkish Foreign Policy and Armament Program.

Ankara, Turkey,

No. 419 November 15, 1937.

Subject: Turkish Foreign Policy and Armament Program.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 18 of November 11, 1937, transmitting a request made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to the purchase in the United States by the Turkish Government of forty
1/ Vultee planes and to forward herewith a memorandum of my conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on that occasion. I believe that Dr. Aras' exposition of Turkey's foreign policy will be of interest to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Robert F. Kelley,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:
1/ Memorandum of conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs.

824.8/710
RFK/rs

Copies sent to Paris, London, Berlin, Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens, Bern.

mmd.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 419 of November 15, 1937, from the American Embassy at Ankara.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, on Wednesday, November 10, 1937, at 6:30 p. m.

I called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs at his request. He said that he had a request which he would like to have me transmit to Mr. Hull. He then explained that the Turkish Government had entered into a contract through the Turkish Embassy in Washington for the purchase of approximately forty Vultee planes. He repeated several times that the contract was a general one and did not cover all details. He said that it had been a practice of the Turkish Government in dealing with American firms to enter into general agreements and not, as it does in case of European firms, to make contracts cover every little detail. Reading from a memorandum and also from a telegram from the Turkish Embassy in Washington, he mentioned July 27, 1937, as the date specified for the delivery of the planes but added that provision was made for a certain delay under certain conditions. He said the first tests had taken place on October 6th but that they had not given entirely satisfactory results; that subsequently, on October 18th, a satisfactory type had been demonstrated.

He said that it was of vital importance to Turkey that these planes be delivered without delay. They constituted the last item in Turkey's three-year aviation program. All other contracts made in connection with that program have been carried out. This last item -- the Vultee planes -- however, was a very important one. He mentioned some figures but he did not appear to be certain as to their accuracy. He said that the first Turkish aviation program -- the three-year one now nearing completion -- contemplated the replacement of approximately one-third of the military planes, -- about 120 out of approximately 300 -- and that consequently the forty Vultee planes represented about one-third of this program. He went on to say that the next program would provide for the renewal of the remaining planes so that upon the completion of that program Turkey would have more than 300 of the most modern type planes. He said that all the other planes which had been ordered had been received and added that the military authorities were greatly pleased with the performance of the Martin bombers purchased in the United States. He repeatedly emphasized that the armament program of Turkey would be greatly impeded if the Vultee planes were not received on time. He said that these planes were lighter than the Martin bombers, but that they had a far greater radius of action.

He therefore besought the good offices of Mr. Hull with a view to having the aviation company deliver the planes on time in accordance with its understanding with the Turkish Government. He said he realized the situation in the United States as respects the extent of the

assistance

assistance which Mr. Hull could give to the Turkish Embassy in the matter but he hoped that Mr. Hull would lend such assistance as he could appropriately give. He hoped very much that Mr. Hull would at least give his "moral support".

Dr. Aras then proceeded to set forth at great length Turkey's foreign policy with a view to showing that Turkey's activities in behalf of international peace were greatly handicapped by the lack of adequate armament. He said that Turkey had no aggressive designs against any country, and was not preparing to attack any country. Turkey desired above all else to keep out of war. He said that probably no country had suffered as much from war in the past as had Turkey and their most recent experiences in this regard were still vivid in the minds of the Turkish people. Consequently Turkey sought to maintain friendly relations with all countries. It was the basic aim of Turkey's foreign policy to promote and preserve peace in Southeastern Europe. To realize this objective Turkey must keep clear of any entanglement with the two conflicting groups in Europe. Turkey therefore was endeavoring to keep on good terms with both conflicting groups and to remain aloof from any tie-up with either of them. Dr. Aras was convinced that this was the only policy for Turkey to follow. It was a very difficult policy, however, and required very careful study and observation of international developments, and what was more important, it required absolutely that Turkey have adequate armament and be in a position to give a good account of herself in case of aggression. He said that he had no doubts with regard to the valor and patriotism of the Turkish army but it was essential that it be properly equipped. Turkey was spending a great deal of money on military equipment and would have to continue to spend it in the future.

The Foreign Minister several times made the point that the smaller countries -- the peace loving countries --must be adequately armed. He said it was most unfortunate that many countries had postponed it so long. He mentioned that he had often discussed this point with Mr. Eden.

The second basic element in Turkey's foreign policy was collaboration with neighboring peace loving countries. Such cooperation was realized through the Eastern Pact and the Balkan Entente. He said that the countries in these two groups had assumed only one obligation and that was to consult with each other. He emphasized that none of the countries could enter into an alliance with another country without the approval of all other countries in the group. In practice this meant that no alliance would ever be concluded. He considered the bloc composed of these two groups of countries to be a powerful instrument of peace. He thought that it could play a great rôle in preserving peace in Europe if it represented a strong military force. He repeatedly compared this bloc to the Scandinavian group of countries in northern Europe. Both were composed of countries which desired peace and which were not tied up with

either

er of the conflicting groups in Europe. He said that in his opinion the present situation in Europe differed greatly from the pre-war situation in that before the world war there were only two organized groups in Europe each hostile to the other but that at the present time there was developing a third group composed of the so-called neutral countries -- i.e. those countries which were not tied up with the two conflicting groups.

He thought that the neutral countries, particularly the Balkan Entente-Oriental Pact group could play a much more important rôle in preserving peace than would appear possible at the first glance from the size of their armies and the number of their population. An organized group of countries, with a small but powerful military force, which maintained freedom of action could play a decisive rôle at the critical moment by throwing its weight on one side or the other. He used figures to illustrate his point and stated that if there were two conflicting groups with approximately ten million soldiers in each and a third group with only two million, although the force of two million soldiers was relatively a very small one as compared with each of the other two forces, nevertheless at a critical time a decision on the part of the small group to support one of the larger groups might well have a decisive effect on the course of developments.

Dr. Aras emphasized that in the present situation in Europe the voice and action of peace-loving countries was given little weight unless they possessed military strength. The activities of Turkey and of the Balkan Entente-Oriental Pact group in behalf of the preservation of peace would be seriously handicapped unless they had behind them adequate military power.

He said that Turkey would not associate herself with any diplomatic combination unless it was a group organized to promote peace and he considered that the best test of the sincerity of the aims of any such group would be the attitude of England and the United States towards the group.

He stated several times that he considered that the development of Turkey's armed force was indispensable to enable Turkey not so much to defend herself against some threatened aggression as to play an effective rôle with her associates in the work of preserving peace in Southeastern Europe. He stressed the point that Turkey did not fear so much a direct attack on herself as the outbreak of a conflict in the neighborhood which would ultimately involve her. No one knew, however, what situation would confront Turkey next year. Consequently the Turkish Government considered the carrying out of the armament program a matter of supreme national importance and were greatly concerned with the prospect of delay in the completion of the aviation program which would result from the failure to deliver on time the Vultee planes.

Robert F. Kelley.

RFK/rs

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE 867.21/17 FOR #6845

FROM Military Attache ( ) DATED Aug.25, 1937
TO Turkey NAME

1—1127 GPO

767.00/75

REGARDING:

Maneuvers in Thrace.

Report on attendance of - by military missions from member States of the Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact, as an indication of leadership taken by Turkey in Balkan Affairs.

Wi

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ankara, February 25, 1938.

No. 552

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MAR 30 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Basis of Turkey's Security.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To the Field
In U. S. A.
Copy to ONI
MID
MAR 31 1938

CONFIDENTIAL.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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1938 MAR 23 PM 2 25
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AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File Copy
MAR 24 1938
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C
MAR 30 1938
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 2 1938
File Copy
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to report as of interest to the Department that, in a conversation last evening with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning the effect of recent developments in Europe on Turkey's position, Dr. Aras stated that Turkey's security was based on three factors: (1) her own forces; (2) the Balkan Entente, and (3) the Eastern Entente, and that these factors were not dependent upon the power and influence of the

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APR 4 1938

of the League of Nations. He went on to emphasize that the treaties concluded by Turkey which relate to her security--such as those relating to the Balkan Entente and the Eastern Entente--were not tied up with the League of Nations.

Respectfully yours,

Robert F. Kelley

Robert F. Kelley
Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

4 Carbon Copies
Received

Copy to Paris, Bucharest, Belgrade, Geneva and Athens.

710/820

RFK/g

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/177

SEE 767.83/13 FOR #1358

FROM Egypt ( Fish ) DATED Apr.14, 1938

NAME

TO

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Turkish foreign policy and relations with other countries.

Statement of Dr. Aras during visit to Egypt concerning -.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

DIVISION OF HISTORY,
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMICS

PHILIP W. IRELAND, F.R.G.S., M.A.(Oxon), PH.D.

Recd. & copy to Mr. Kelley 5/13/38 MAY 14 1938.

MAY 16 1938.

19 Wendell Street,
Cambridge, Mass.,
May 9, 1938.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAY 12 1938 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAY 16 1938 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Wallace Murray, Esq.,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Murray,

The Bureau of International Research of Harvard University has given me a grant for research in Turkey during the coming summer. My research will revolve around the general subject: "The bases of Turkish foreign policy". I hope to discover how far the political, economic and social changes in Turkey during the last fifteen years have affected Turkish foreign policy. It will be my purpose to observe economic development, social progress, industrial development, the development of transportation, the encouragement of agriculture, how far the tendency has progressed towards economic self-sufficiency and a number of kindred and related subjects.

It is my hope, in addition to my observations, to be able to interview a number of responsible Turkish officials and to obtain information from other personal and printed sources wherever possible. I should be very grateful for any assistance which United States officials in Turkey may feel able to give me in facilitating my research.

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FILED

I expect to sail shortly for Turkey and will be in Istanbul about May 31. I shall arrive in Ankara about a week later.

I appreciate greatly the advice and assistance which you gave me on my recent visit to Washington.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Philip W. Ireland

May 16 1938.

Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Philip W. Ireland, of the Division of History, Government and Economics at Harvard. As you may know, Ireland is the author of a recent book on Iraq which received very favorable comment from qualified reviewers. He has been known to the Division for some years and I think you will find him quite trustworthy. In reply to his letter I have suggested that he call upon you upon his arrival in Turkey, and I should be grateful if you would help him out in any way that you properly can.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Wallace Murray

Enclosure:
From Mr. Ireland,
May 9, 1938.

767.00/78

Robert F. Kelley, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Istanbul.

MAY 16 1938.

A true copy of the signed original.

NE PHA/LS

May 16 1938.

Dear Mr. Ireland:

I have received your letter of May 9, 1938, telling me of your proposed research work in Turkey. I am writing to Mr. Robert Kelley, First Secretary of our Embassy at Ankara, telling him of your coming visit and asking him to assist you in any way he properly can. I suggest, therefore, that upon your arrival in Turkey you get in touch with Mr. Kelley. It is difficult to say whether he will be in Istanbul or Ankara at the time you arrive inasmuch as the commissioned staff of the Embassy usually leaves Ankara about June 1. However, this year they may stay somewhat longer in view of our present trade agreement negotiations with the Turkish Government.

I trust that you will have an interesting and profitable visit in Turkey.

Sincerely yours,

MAY 16 1938.

Wallace Murray
Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Philip W. Ireland,
19 Wendell Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

NE PHA/LS

A true copy of the signed original.

767.00/78

May 24 1938

Dear Bob:

With reference to my letter of May 16, 1938, regarding the intended visit of Philip W. Ireland to Turkey, I believe you may be interested in the enclosed copy of a recent despatch from Baghdad, forwarding a copy of a review of Mr. Ireland's book on Iraq.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

Enclosure:

From Legation, Baghdad,
No. 998 of April 9, 1938.
890g.00/446

A true copy of the signed original.

Robert F. Kelley, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Istanbul.

NE GVA/LS

767.00/78

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 697 Istanbul, June 15, 1938.

Subject: Transmission of memorandum of conversation with H. E. Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1938.

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JUN 30 1938
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 20 1938
Department of State

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
JUL 11 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

767.00/79

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FOR DISTRIBUTION ...
To the Field
In U. S. A.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

767.00

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 1 - 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum of the conversation which I had yesterday with Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in so far as it concerned Turkey's relationship to the general political situation in Europe, the Near East, and the Far East.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-M/C
JUL 20 1938

FILED
AUG 11 1938

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray

J. V. A. MacMURRAY

Enclosure:
Memorandum of conversation.

710

MacM:KOS

4 Carbon Copies
Received

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 697 dated June 15, 1938, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey, on subject of "Transmission of memorandum of conversation with H. E. Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1938.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Istanbul, June 14, 1938.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Turkey's relationship to the political situation in Europe, the Near East, and the Far East.

(Separate memoranda of this conversation, in regard to the Hatay Question and the negotiations for a Trade Agreement.)

PARTICIPANTS: H. E. Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Ambassador.

PLACE AND DATE OF CONVERSATION: Pera Palace Hotel, Istanbul, June 14, 1938, at 3 p.m.

Upon our meeting after my absence of more than a year from Turkey, Dr. Aras, with his usual rather dogmatic expansiveness, undertook to bring me up-to-date on the political situation as it appears from the standpoint of the Turkish Government.

After speaking of the very discouraging developments of the past year both in Europe and in the Far East, he once more emphasized the position of the Turkish Government as endeavoring to hold aloof from the various groupings of the powers, to retain relations of friendship with all alike, and to exercise such influence as it could in the interests of peace.

He spoke specifically of various attempts to draw Turkey into such groupings. In view of their long-standing close relationship, the Soviet Government had wished Turkey to make an alliance: France, likewise, in connection with the discussion of the Hatay Question, had proposed such an alliance. On its part, Germany had offered Turkey financial inducements on a very large

scale,

scale, with a view to enlisting her against the Western powers and Russia. Turkey, however, had seen only danger in associating herself with the effort of one group to isolate or encircle another, and continued to follow scrupulously the policy of avoiding becoming an instrument either for or against one or the other grouping. She had, moreover, had occasion during the past year to exercise her influence, both in the Balkans and in Western Asia, to forestall tendencies towards a more adventurous policy. He spoke of having successfully counteracted a temptation on the part of certain of the countries of the Balkan Entente to gravitate towards Germany. He also spoke of having exercised with the Governments of both Iran and the Soviet Union a tranquillizing influence in a situation which had threatened to throw Iran into the arms of Germany; and he further said that Turkey had been able to dissuade Afghanistan from falling under the influence of either Germany or Japan.

He then spoke of the Far Eastern situation, expressing the apprehension that the Japanese might quite probably take a course of action which would embroil them with Soviet Russia in the very near future. He explained his apprehensions on this point by setting forth what he conceived to be the various alternatives open to Japan in the present situation:-

One possibility (which he himself characterized as far-fetched) was that Japan might succeed in making an arrangement among all the powers -- presumably including Soviet Russia -- by which they would, in return for Japan's assurance that she would fully respect their commercial interests in China, "hold the ring" for her. But it could not be expected that Soviet Russia could, with the safety of her own possessions

in

in view, do otherwise than continue to abet and prolong China's resistance against Japan. For this, if for no other reason, the idea of "holding the ring" in this way seemed to be manifestly out of the question.

Another possibility was that Japan and Soviet Russia might compose their differences and agree to partition China between them for exploitation. He surprised me by making quite categorically the statement that Japan had threatened this when recently demanding of the German Government that it withdraw the German military advisers hitherto assisting General Chiang Kai-shek; and he added his opinion that the German Government's acceding to this demand had confirmed the close relationship between the German and Japanese Governments, and made it out of the question that Japan should reverse her policy and seek an understanding with Russia.

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Having disposed of these somewhat speculative possibilities, Dr. Aras went on to consider what he spoke of as the only practicable alternatives for Japan to follow in view of the likelihood that she would in the near future extend her invasion of China as far as Hankow, forcing the Chinese Government to take refuge in either Szechwan or Yunnan.

Japan might of course attempt, in the immense occupied area of China proper, to repeat what she had done in Manchuria by setting up and supporting a puppet government. But apart from the vastly greater difficulties of repeating the Manchurian method in an area so much larger and so much more densely populated, there would prove to be special difficulties in view of the different racial character of the people in China proper. (Dr. Aras seemed to me to lay undue emphasis upon this latter point, under the mis-

apprehension

apprehension that those of Manchu race, and speaking the Manchu language, are the dominant element of the population, instead of a rather insignificant minority.) In any case, the establishment of such a puppet state throughout the occupied area of China would not put an end to the resistance of the Chinese; it would probably lead, on the contrary, to a nominally internecine war which might be expected to continue ten or fifteen or more years, and prove far too heavy a burden for Japan to carry.

The only available alternative for Japan was to cut off completely the supply of munitions to the Chinese forces. She might well be able to stop the importation of supplies by sea, and perhaps by way of Indo-China; but the Chinese would always be in a position to resist so long as Soviet Russia found it to her interest to continue the supply of munitions through Sinkiang. It seemed to Dr. Aras inevitable, therefore, that sooner or later Japan must attempt to encircle China proper to the North, in order to cut off the supplies from Russia; and he considered that this would almost inevitably bring Japan to an outright clash with the Soviet Union.

761.93

He made, as though incidentally, the amazing statement that Japan had contemplated attacking these Chinese sources of supply from the West, with her base in Afghanistan. He said that proposals to that effect had been strongly urged upon the Afghans by Japanese agents, and had been not altogether unsympathetically received; but that Turkey had happily succeeded in dissuading the Afghans from committing themselves to such an adventure, as well as from the acceptance of tempting German offers for the mineral exploitation of Afghanistan. He assured me that both of these dangerous developments had now been definitely forestalled and disposed of.

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Dr.

Dr. Aras was inclined to think it most likely that Japan would not make a clean-cut adoption of either of the alternatives open; but would divide her efforts between supporting a new Chinese puppet state, and undertaking the gradual encirclement of China along the edges of the deserts; in which case the expected clash with Russia might be delayed for another year or so.

To a question as to what would happen in case war between Japan and Russia should result from such a clash -- particularly whether it might be anticipated that Germany would take action against the Soviet Union -- Dr. Aras said that that would depend in the first instance upon Poland, whose attitude could not be predicted without consideration of the particular circumstances that might prevail at the moment; but he went on to say that Germany would scarcely be in a position to act unless she had a base of operations somewhere in the Balkans. Here he emphasized again that Turkey's influence with her associates of the Balkan Entente had been in the direction of fortifying their resistance to German political or economic domination; and he again dwelt upon Turkey's unwillingness to become subservient to any policy of hostility on the part of one group of powers against another, and spoke admiringly of the moderation shown by the British Government in refusing to become a party to the encirclement of Germany; and he also expressed his appreciation of the British financial assistance which has made it possible for Turkey to avoid putting herself under obligations to Germany that would have involved her subordination to German political aims.

MacM.

MacM:KOS

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~WWB~~

PA/H
Mr. Hornbeck

I believe you will want to read Mr. Mac Murray's conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister in its entirety.

FAS.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
AUG 1 - 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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JUL 9 1938
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUL 8 - 1938
NOTED

## DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
JUL 7 - 1938
MR. WELLES

July 2, 1938.

A-M - Mr. Messersmith:
U - Mr. Welles:
S - Mr. Secretary:

Mr. MacMurray, our Ambassador in Turkey, reports an interesting conversation which he has had with Dr. Tevfik Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister. Dr. Aras is said to have undertaken, "with his usual rather dogmatic expansiveness," to inform Mr. MacMurray of the world political situation as it has developed during the year the Ambassador has been absent from Turkey.

Turkey, Dr. Aras declared, was continuing to hold aloof from any close association with either of the major European groups and was exerting, with considerable success, its influence to prevent the Balkan or Near Eastern nations from coming under the domination of either. Russia and France had both attempted to draw Turkey into an alliance, while Germany had offered large financial inducements for a like purpose. Turkey had not only resisted these overtures herself, but had recently prevented the Balkan Entente from gravitating towards Germany. Turkey had been able to tranquilize differences between Russia and Iran which threatened to throw Iran into the German camp, and had also kept Afghanistan from falling under the influence of Japan, the Foreign Minister declared.

FW 767.00/79

Dr. Aras thought that Japan could hardly escape from becoming embroiled with Russia within the next year or two, over the Chinese war. Japan could not end resistance in China until she stopped the importation of armaments into China from Russia. To do this, Japan must have completely encircled China from the north and west. This, he believed, would mean a conflict with Russia. Dr. Aras made the astonishing statement that Japan had even contemplated attacking, from the west through Afghanistan, Chinese sources of supplies from Russia. The Afghans had not been altogether unsympathetic to Japanese suggestions in this respect, but Turkey had been able to dissuade Afghanistan from any such commitments.

Mr. MacMurray asked what Germany's position would be in case of a war between Japan and Russia. Dr. Aras replied that that would depend, in the first instance, upon the attitude of Poland, which could not be predicted. He added, however, that at any rate Germany would require a base of operations in the Balkans. For this reason, Turkey's action in preventing Germany from obtaining political or economic domination in the Balkans had been of great importance.

Dr. Aras spoke admiringly of the moderation shown by the British Government in refusing to become a party to the encirclement of Germany. He also expressed appreciation for the recent credit of $80,000,000 extended to Turkey by Britain, which has made it possible for Turkey to avoid putting herself under obligation to Germany that would have involved her subordination to German political aims.

The conversation reported above is of particular interest in view of the intense jockeying for position now going on in Turkey by Great Britain and France on the one hand and Italy and Germany on the other. It will be recalled that for more than a century prior to the World War, and particularly during the years following the Crimean War, Great Britain was the dominating influence in the Ottoman Empire and throughout the Near East. The British Ambassador's suggestions to the Sultan at Constantinople carried far more weight than the suggestions of any other person. During a comparatively few years preceding 1914, while British attention was concentrated elsewhere, the situation changed radically. When the World War began, Britain found, to the surprise of many British officials, that Britain's position in Turkey had

been completely supplanted by Germany. That Turkey would swing to the Central Powers in that conflict appeared obvious to most observers, but numerous British diplomats of the old schools were unwilling to believe it could happen until it did. Since the World War, Great Britain, having learned its lesson, has given every evidence of a determination not to be caught napping in the Near East again. The British propaganda efforts in Greece, the British credit to Turkey, and the recent pressure which Britain has exerted on France to satisfy Turkey in the Sanjak, are but a few evidences that in case of another major conflict, Great Britain does not intend to find Turkey under the influence of the Berlin-Rome axis.

Britain is fortunate in that the President of Turkey, while a dictator, is not an admirer of Germany. Atatürk gained a lively hatred of Germans and German methods when he served under Von Sanders during the World War. While he lives, it seems probable that British efforts in Turkey will be received as sympathetically as the economic position of Turkey will permit. The recent British credit, ~~$30~~ £8,000,000, of which the British are understood to consider in the nature

of an outright grant, is generally understood to have been extended for the purpose of enabling Turkey to escape from German economic domination, but Dr. Aras' statement to Mr. MacMurray is the first admission to this effect which we have had from a Turkish official.

Wallace Murray

NE: GVA

767.00/79

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE 767.90h 11/10 FOR #845

FROM Turkey (MacMurray) DATED Oct. 13,1938

TO NAME 1—1127 GPO

REGARDING: Turkey's policy towards the countries of western Asia. Translation of remarks made by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Grand National Assembly discussing --.

767.00/80

lec

767.00

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/81

SEE 867.00/3068 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department (Hare) DATED Dec.8, 1938
TO Near Eastern Division
NAME

1—1127

REGARDING: Turkish general foreign policy.

Conversation with Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of TAN, who commented on -.

Wi

767.00

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/82

SEE 740.00/693 FOR Tel.#20, 7pm.

FROM Turkey ( MacMurray ) DATED March 27, 1939.

TO NAME

1—1127 ere

REGARDING: Turkish Foreign Policy.

Turkish policy seems to consist of support of the Balkan Entente, inclinations towards Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union and a certain realistic attitude towards European affairs in general.

hc

767.00

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

767.00/83

SEE 765.75/486 FOR Tel#35 11 p.m.

FROM Turkey (MacMurray) DATED April 12, 1939

TO NAME 1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Turkey ready to acquit herself of her full obligations under the Entente Agreement but Turkey is not prepared to commit herself to further obligations of military support to another Balkan Entente state.

ml

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE fw 811.607 New York, 1939/1186 FOR Memo

FROM State Department Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Murray ) DATED Mar. 23, 1939
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Radio address of President Inonu of Turkey in connection with New York World's Fair.

Comments on certain statements in - pertaining to policy of Turkey with respect to alignment of that country with Great Britain and United States in maintaining peace in Europe.

lw

767.00/84

# DOCUMENT FILE

# NOTE

SEE 740.00/1378 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department NE ( Murray ) DATED Apr. 24, 1939

TO NAME 1—1127 etc.

REGARDING: Turkish policy: Statement of the Turkish Ambassador that if he were called upon by his government to express any views as to course which should follow he would be very cautious in tying up too closely with the British.

mb

767.00/85

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

**SUBJECT** Turkish Foreign Minister's recent speech before the National Assembly;

Berlin press reaction to-

767.00/86

**For the original paper from which reference is taken**

**See** Tel. #630, 8 p.m.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

**Dated** July 11, 1939 **From / To** Germany (Kirk)

**File No.** 740.00/1899

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

mb

CJ

GRAY

BERLIN

Dated July 11, 1939

Rec'd 3:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

note
767.00

630, July 11, 8 p.m.

The Berlin press treats with scorn the Turkish Foreign Minister's recent speech before the National Assembly and dismisses his supposedly friendly references to Germany and Italy as a hypocritical gesture learned from association with the "encirclement powers". The other countries of the Balkan league are asked to ponder the Foreign Minister's admission that Turkey had "left the way of neutrality" and are directed to decide whether this position is consonant with the purpose of the League which was to avoid involvement in the conflicts with the great powers. Turkey is represented as having miscalculated in failing to recognize that Italy has displaced Great Britain as the first power in the Mediterranean and that Great Britain's might and prestige have steadily waned. Turkish strictures upon Italy's seizure of Albania are contrasted with Turkey's insistence upon the cession of the San Jak of

Alexandretta

Alexandretta and its present opportunistic attitude is characterized as a reversion to historical policy.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1939 AUG 22 PM 2 34

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Istanbul, Turkey,

August 4, 1939.

No. 1175

Subject: Turkish Foreign Relations and Policies.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 23 1939
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 7 1939
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. DUNN
OCT 10 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

767.00/87

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

FILED
SEP 27 1939

Sir:

1/, 2/ I have the honor to forward, for the Department's information, translations of two recent authoritative statements regarding Turkey's foreign relations and policies, one of which was made by the President of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, at the opening of the Fifth Congress of the Republican People's Party on May 29, 1939, and the other by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Şükrü Saracoglu, at the closing session of the Grand National Assembly

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Assembly on July 8, 1939. While these statements do not disclose any facts or considerations which have not already been brought to the Department's attention, they are of interest for the light which they throw on the viewpoints and intentions of the present rulers of Turkey in respect to the existing international situation.

It is the view of President Inönü that the dominant characteristic of the present international situation is the fear of many nations that they may be "overwhelmed by a sudden storm". The prevailing insecurity cannot continue indefinitely. It must end either in nations flying at each other's throats or in their finding the road to peaceful collaboration. Turkey will welcome any solution calculated to restore international security, but the right of smaller countries to independence and free national existence must be fully recognized. "We do not accept, we shall never accept, the theory according to which the smaller groups of humanity are destined to be absorbed by the larger ones. The right of each nation conscious of its individual existence to form an independent State, assured of the safeguard of its integrity, must be consecrated as an inviolable law common to all humanity". Turkey's search for security has led her to form a common front with nations which share its principles and ideas. This explains Turkey's joining the Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact. The present security crisis has led Turkey to enter into an alliance with Great Britain. Turkey will not avoid other engagements which may be of assistance in the insurance of her security. Turkey is deeply concerned

over

over the security of her neighbors and she will take all steps in her power to check the dangers which may threaten them "because we are convinced that a little later these same dangers would threaten ourselves". The President called attention to Turkey's cordial relations with the Soviet Union. "Each of these two countries has the most complete and the most direct interest in the security and welfare of the other". He referred to the community of interests between Turkey and France. In concluding, he declared that if, in spite of Turkey's wishes, a new struggle should break out, the Turkish nation would take part in the struggle without hesitation and scornful of all dangers. If need should arise Turkey would take its place side by side with the nations which have the same ideals and the same vital interests. It is Turkey's most fervent wish, however, to see a peace established "which allows everyone to share in the riches of our globe".

3/ In connection with the President's speech, there is enclosed, as of interest to the Department, a copy of an excerpt from an article in the LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH AND MORNING POST of July 10, 1939, relative to an interview which he gave recently to a correspondent of that newspaper. In discussing the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assistance, the President said that he felt that Turkey's strength was as important to Great Britain as Great Britain's strength was to Turkey. If Great Britain's position in the Mediterranean weakened, Turkey would suffer. Since the aims of the two countries were identical, it was essential to

<u>their</u>

their mutual interests that they stand together. The President had great hopes that the new relationship between Great Britain and this country would assist Turkey to transform her present precarious trading system into a free exchange of goods. With reference to the situation in the Balkans, the President stated that Turkey would like to see Bulgaria join the Balkan Entente. Turkey had always worked to this end, and had not yet lost hope of Bulgaria's adherence.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement to the Grand National Assembly, pointed out that Turkey was an advocate of peace because of the "innumerable benefits which it brings to Turkey and to humanity as a whole". He reviewed the progress accomplished by Turkey during the years that she has lived in peace. "No victory could give us what a series of years of peace has bestowed upon us". If, however, there should be an attempt to make Turkey pay more dearly for this peace than what war would cost, "one would see that we are ready also to show how fit we are for war and desirous of the victory which it promises". Mr. Saracoglu declared that for many years Turkey had pursued its search for peace through a policy of neutrality. The situation which existed previously, however, had been completely changed by recent developments. "The distance between the sound of words and the click of arms, between the thunder of controversy and that of cannon has become less and less; the independence of certain countries has been entirely or partially suppressed by <u>faits accomplis</u> created through violence". The new developments in the field of international politics caused Turkey to reflect and to consider whether peace would be ensured by her

continuing

continuing to remain neutral. The events in Central Europe persuaded Turkey that there was "not much more time left for us to take the measures which were indispensable for national security and to find another way capable of serving the cause of peace". Finally, the invasion of Albania, "a country producing neither foodstuffs nor raw materials, having no mineral wealth and no fertile land", led Turkey to abandon her policy of neutrality and join the "peace front". The result was the Turkish-British Declaration of Mutual Assistance. Referring to criticism in the German press of Turkey's action, Mr. Saracoglu stated that these newspapers seem to have forgotten that Hitler, in MEIN KAMPF, had recommended to the German people an alliance with England. "One might justly doubt the logic which considers bad for the Turkish people a friendship which it recommends to the German people". A Declaration of Mutual Assistance similar to that between Great Britain and Turkey was entered into with France as soon as all differences between France and Turkey had been removed by the settlement of the Hatay problem. Mr. Saracoglu pointed out that while the invasion of Albania was the principal factor which brought about Turkey's adherence to the "peace front", her action in this regard was the natural result of the political developments in recent years. He mentioned the various occasions upon which Turkey, England, and France had cooperated in the past - the Abyssinian War, the Montreux Conference, and the Nyon Conference. Today "we are busy working out the details of the definitive long term arrangements which will insure the unity of the three Powers".

It is the opinion of the Turkish Foreign Minister that all civilizations are the fruit of long periods of

peace

peace and that war can never create a civilization. In the present European civilization, the small independent States play a rôle just as important as - perhaps more important than - the larger States. "To suppress them would be to hinder the march of civilization and of progress. That is not possible, and those who think that it is possible are preparing for a bitter future". Mr. Saracoglu stressed the cordial friendship existing between Turkey and the Soviet Union. "Every international event has always found the two Powers side by side in the same ranks". The visit of Mr. Potemkin to Ankara demonstrated once more that "without understanding, without previous conversations, the two countries in the presence of the same events have the same reactions and the same thoughts". The Balkan Pact would continue to serve peace in the Balkans with the same efficacity and the same authority as heretofore. "Our recent contacts and exchanges of views have clearly proved that to us". Turkey desired to maintain normal relations with all powers, including Germany and Italy. The Foreign Minister pointed out, however, that the desire for normal and friendly relations must be mutual. Relations with Italy continued as in the past, and while, in the case of Germany, a certain hesitation was noted for a time, this had now disappeared except in respect to one matter which it was hoped would be favorably settled in the near future.

With reference to the Foreign Minister's statement regarding the negotiations in progress relative to the definitive long-term arrangements which will assure the unity of Turkey, Great Britain, and France, it may be stated that these negotiations are being carried on in a

<u>rather</u>

rather desultory fashion. It would appear that formulae are being exchanged with France and Great Britain with regard to the clauses of the definitive treaties of mutual assistance. It may well be that the procrastination of the Turkish Government in this matter is, as is freely rumored, motivated by Turkey's reluctance to undertake more concrete engagements except in the light of such agreement as may eventually be reached in the pending negotiations of the British and French Governments with the Soviet Government. The French Ambassador informed a member of my staff yesterday that after a long period of inaction he had just received a memorandum from the Turkish Government which he had forwarded to Paris. It is the opinion of the Embassy that a considerable time will elapse before the definitive treaties are ready for signature.

With respect to military consultations between the countries in question, preliminary contacts have already been established through the visits of French and British Military Missions to Turkey. As has been reported to the Department, the British Military Mission were disappointed with the treatment which they received in Turkey. It would appear that the French Military Mission has had greater success. The latter, which was presided over by General Huntziger, former Commander of the French troops in the Levant, an officer with whom the Turks were already acquainted, was received cordially by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, who had avoided meeting the British Military Mission. The French Ambassador and the French Military Attaché have expressed themselves as

very much pleased with the results of the discussions between their Military Mission and the Turkish military authorities. It is probable that collaboration between the Turkish Army and the British and French Armies will be worked out principally through discussions between the French and Turkish military authorities, and that naval and air cooperation will be arranged through British-Turkish conversations. It would appear that the principal problems confronting the British and French military authorities in respect to military cooperation with Turkey are (1) the Turkish Army's great lack of modern equipment and the difficulty in repairing this deficiency immediately in view of the rearmament programs in the course of execution in Great Britain and France;* and (2) the necessity of rejuvenating, intellectually as well as physically, the Turkish High Command, and the difficulty in effecting this change in view of the outstanding position occupied in the country by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in his speech that Turkey desired to maintain normal relations with Germany and Italy, and that, while relations with Italy continued as in the past, a certain hesitation had been noted for awhile in the case of Germany, but that this had now disappeared except in respect to one matter, which it was hoped would be favorably settled in the near future.

It

* The Embassy understands that an arrangement is now under discussion whereby GreatBritain would make available to Turkey funds for the purchase of military equipment in the United States.

It would appear that Mr. Saracoglu was unduly optimistic in this respect. Uncertainty still prevails in the field of Turkish-German relations, and it would seem to be the aim of Germany to keep Turkey in a state of uncertainty as to what policy Germany intends to pursue. The unsettled matter referred to by the Minister is believed to be the question of the delivery of military supplies ordered by Turkey in Germany. In so far as the Embassy is aware, Germany has not taken any definitive action in this matter. In respect to certain supplies, the German policy seems to be to refrain from making deliveries, without definitely refusing to do so. Of the 24 long-range cannon ordered from Skoda, only two have been delivered, and of the order for 60 Messerschmidt planes placed by Turkey in Germany about eight months ago, none has so far been delivered. It is the belief of the Embassy that neither of these two items will be furnished to Turkey by Germany. On the other hand, it is understood that certain other military supplies have been delivered since the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Assistance Pact. In this connection, there is enclosed, as indicating the German attitude in the matter of the delivery of military supplies to Turkey, a Memorandum of a Conversation had by Consul Latimer relating to this matter. 4/

As regards general commercial relations, it may be stated that while the Turkish-German Agreement with reference to the extension to Turkey by Germany of a 150,000,000 Mark credit has not yet been put into effect, German agencies are continuing to make large-scale purchases in Turkey. It is understood that the Turkish authorities are making plans to meet the alternative

courses of action which they consider Germany may pursue with regard to trade with Turkey. On one hand, Germany may endeavor to expand her trade with Turkey to the utmost with a view to diminishing Turkey's trade with other countries and thus reducing Turkey to greater dependence on Germany. In this connection, it may be stated that Turkey's trade with free exchange countries is now greatly hampered by the high prices of Turkish commodities brought about largely through the operation of clearing agreements, especially that with Germany. On the other hand, Germany may greatly reduce her purchases in Turkey with a view to disorganizing Turkey's economy in consequence of her inability to find markets for the products previously purchased by Germany.

Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Assistance Pact, the Turkish Government has adopted two measures which have been directed against Italian and German nationals. With a view to reducing the large number of German nationals employed in Turkey, the Government decided early in June not to renew the employment contracts of German nationals. This decision has been applied not only to German citizens employed in military factories and other establishments of importance to national defense, but also to those engaged as teachers, doctors, et cetera. It would appear that in carrying out this decision the Turkish authorities have made no distinction between Aryans and non-Aryans, and that German Jews receive the same treatment as non-Jews. There is, however, some

reason to believe that the Turkish Government is now intending to conclude new contracts, at the beginning of the next academic year, with at any rate certain of the medical and other professors whose services are particularly desired. The second measure - one which has been made applicable to all foreigners, but which is directed against Italians and Germans, - is the establishment of "temporary" restrictions on travel to certain areas in Turkey, particularly the western and southern coast regions. These areas are now accessible to foreigners only by special permission. The Embassy has heard that the Assistant German Military Attaché, a Secretary of the Italian Embassy, and a German archaeologist are among those who have complained against restrictions placed upon their movements.

Respectfully yours,

J. V.A. MacMURRAY.

Enclosures:

1/ - Translation of inaugural address of President Ismet Inönü at the opening session of the Fifth Congress of the Republican People's Party;

2/ - Translation of Statement of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs;

3/ - Copy of excerpt from THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London, July 10, 1939;

4/ - Copy of Memorandum of Conversation of June 15, 1939.

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RFK:mej

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1175 dated August 4, 1939, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT

SOURCE: BULLETIN OF
ANATOLIAN AGENCY
dated May 29, 1939.

Inaugural Address of President Ismet Inönü
at the opening session of the Fifth Congress
of the Republican People's Party.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Dear Colleagues:

The exigencies of the international situation have forced us to devote more attention to the preparation of our defensive power which, moreover, has always been the object of our solicitude. Humanity is now passing through a serious crisis in the international sphere. Many nations are uneasy at the thought that they may be overwhelmed by a sudden storm. That is the dominant characteristic of the dangerous period through which we are now passing.

This insecurity which prevails among the nations cannot continue indefinitely. It can end in only two alternatives: either nations, blinded by the excess of a frenzied tension, will fly at each other's throats, in an irrational impulse, or reason will prevail and nations will seek and find together the road which will lead them to peaceful collaboration in a common ideal of humanity.

It is in the conviction that I am here the interpreter of the sincere wishes of your Congress that I declare that we reserve the warmest and most ardent welcome for any solution which will restore international security. Every nation has the right and the duty to participate in the efforts which will lead it towards this happy result. It is only necessary that the discussion take

place

place in full confidence. However, one principle, which overshadows all others, should be uppermost in all minds: the right to independence and free national existence must be fully and frankly accorded to peoples comparatively small in numbers as well as to nations with a large population. We do not accept, we shall never accept, the theory according to which the smaller groups of humanity are destined to be absorbed by the larger ones. The right of each nation, conscious of its individual existence, to form an independent state assured of the safeguard of its integrity, must be consecrated as an inviolable law, common to all humanity. The common search for security has led us in the course of the development of our international relations to form a common front with the nations which have the same principles and the same mentality as ourselves. It is from this angle that I beg you to consider the international agreements and alliances which we have concluded.

Sincerely animated by this spirit, we joined the Pact of the Balkan Entente and that of Saadabad. In the midst of the security crisis which rages today throughout all Europe, the Turco-British Alliance is nothing else but the reciprocal engagement of two states which have no aggressive aim and seek only their own security while pursuing a common ideal, that of peace and humanity. We shall not shun other engagements which might assist in the realization of this common interest of peace and humanity. We have settled with our neighbors all differences of whatever nature. We are today deeply concerned over their security. We shall take all steps in our power to check the dangers which might

threaten

threaten them. For we are convinced that a little later these same dangers would threaten us ourselves.

I take pleasure in being able to tell you that our relations with the U. S. S. R., based on mutual confidence, are more cordial than ever. It is a great satisfaction for me to add that each of these two countries has the most complete and the most direct interest in the security and welfare of the other.

Once the sole question which we are discussing with France has been settled, that of the Hatay, which, moreover, is on the point of being solved since a complete agreement in principle has already been reached, nothing can ever alter the intimacy of our relations with France, so complete is the community of interests of the two countries and of the two peoples.

My dear Comrades:

You will not be surprised if I tell you that under the present conditions of international crisis care for our defense is the most important of our preoccupations. The Government of the Republic is conscious of the unavoidable necessity in which it finds itself of increasing its potential defense power to the extent necessary to assure the safeguard of its disinterested ideal.

Turkey is conscious of the fact that beyond the scope of its own defense it has put itself in the service of the whole human family and its common aspiration toward peace, and if, in spite of our wishes the world should become the scene of a new struggle, the Turkish Nation, mindful of the duties conferred upon it by humanity and civilization,

will

will be able to take part in this struggle, with heroism, without hesitation and scornful of all dangers. This nation has firmly decided, if the need therefor should arise, and side by side with the nations which have the same ideal and which share the same vital interests, to add new pages of great deeds and glory to the record of history. We hasten to add that we do not think any more of refusing the right to life to any of the nations which seem at present to be opposing each other than of denying either the high human mission devolving upon each one of them or the virtues which adorn them. I repeat once more that our most fervid wish is to see a peace established which allows everyone to share in the riches of our globe.

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RS:mej

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1175 dated August 4, 1939, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

TRANSLATION

SOURCE: ANKARA,
July 13, 1939.

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Gentlemen:

Peace for us, peace for the world. That is our foreign policy. We were partisans of peace yesterday, we are so today and we shall continue to be so tomorrow. We are for peace because during the past 20 years which we have lived in peace we have demonstrated the progress and the development of which Turkey is capable.

The weariness of an interminable war, the devastations which it had brought with it were obliterated by these 20 peaceful years. Our schools and the number of young citizens which attended them have increased, our agricultural production has shown a constant rise; instead of importing flour worth a million and a half pounds, which we were obliged to do scarcely 15 years ago, today we export considerable quantities of cereals.

Our railroads are being extended at the rate of hundreds of kilometers every year.

Our industries, almost nil at the beginning, are developing from day to day. Large and small factories are being established at different points in the country and we see active and prosperous urban centers being built up around them.

And we are also indebted to the years of peace for our beautiful new capital.

We have a university at Ankara, even several faculties, attended by bold youth.

Each

Each year of peace brings us an increase in population of 350,000 persons.

Our heroic Army, the glory of our nation, is due to the years during which it was able to prepare itself in peace; the high degree of efficiency which it has reached on land,sea, and in the air.

Gentlemen:

No victory could give us what a series of years of peace has bestowed upon us, and no man of courage could lightly resolve to see these magnificent achievements disappear in the flames of an armed struggle.

That is also true, with differences in details, for each country as it is for us.

I have already told you enough to prove that it is not only the Government of Refik Saydam but the whole Turkish nation which is attached to peace by solid ties, by its innermost fibres.

But let us understand things correctly. If we love peace it is not for itself but for the innumerable benefits which it brings to Turkey and to humanity as a whole. And if, some time, an attempt were made to make us pay more dearly for this peace than what war would cost us, then one would see that we are ready also to show hot fit we are for war and desirous of the victory which it promises.

For many years we pursued through a policy of neutrality this search for peace for ourselves and for the world.

For, at that time, an institution of peace, the League of Nations, was still standing in the height of its authority.

Every State was devoting its attention to its own difficulties, its own problems, and the ideological discussions did not appear to exceed the character of intellectual contests.

And

And finally one was led to believe that even if war should break out at some point on the globe it would be localized.

Later we saw the authority of the League of Nations collapse, and endeavors to limit armaments go bankrupt, new groups and axes constituted.

The distance between the sound of the words and the click of arms, between the thunder of controversy and that of the cannon become less, the independence of certain countries has been entirely or partially suppressed by faits accomplis created through violence.

In the presence of this new development of political action we were led to ask ourselves whether it would be possible for us, by continuing to remain neutral, to ensure our policy of peace for ourselves and for all.

These acts, having absolutely no basis of legality, caused us to reflect, as they could not help but cause all nations to reflect, however far they might be from the scene of the action.

You all remember, Gentlemen, that at the time of which I am speaking Central Europe was passing through a serious crisis. Moreover, this crisis has not yet been passed, it remains in the endemic stage now appearing to be calm and then reassuming its virulence, manifesting itself first in one country and then in another.

The lesson which we could not help but draw from these events was that there was not much more time left for us to take indispensable measures for national security and to find another way capable of serving the cause of peace.

Finally

Finally the invasion of Albania, a country producing neither foodstuffs nor raw material, having no mineral wealth, and no fertile land, inspired our decision to abandon our policy of neutrality and to join the peace front. The result of this was the Turkish-British declaration which you know.

Moreover, our search for peace for ourselves and for all has not changed. In fact, it is to consolidate peace that we have joined the peace front.

This action did not fail to be severely criticized by the press of the other side. These newspapers seem to have forgotten that in the fundamental book of the totalitarian régime the English alliance is recommended to the German people. One might justly doubt the logic which considers bad for the Turkish people a friendship which it recommends to the German people.

Simultaneous with our contacts and our conversations with the British we have likewise had talks and contacts with France. As the settlement of the Hatay problem did away with all differences between France and Turkey, a joint declaration similar in all points to that between Turkey and Great Britain has been exchanged with France and the negotiations which were being conducted with the British for a definitive pact for mutual assistance have been coordinated accordingly.

I have just said that the invasion of Albania was from one point of view the principal motive which determined us to join the peace front; I should add that in reality this accession is the natural result of the political events of recent years.

The Turkish nation, the French nation, and the English nation have learned on the fields of battle of the Dardanelles, Syria and Iraq to know and respect each other.

Add to this the traditional friendships bequeathed by history and you will realize the attraction which unites them.

During the Abyssinian War Turkey and England were united by reciprocal engagements in order to ward off dangers which might have arisen as a result of the sanctions.

At Montreux, the representatives of France and England gave proof of a spirit of real sympathy toward the Turkish nation at the time of the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the treaty which reestablished fully the sovereign rights of Turkey over the Straits.

Our delegates who met at Nyon affixed their signatures to a document which was destined to reestablish the disturbed order in the Mediterranean. Finally, in presence of the events in Czechoslovakia and the developments which followed as well as in presence of the occupation of Albania, the three nations had the same reactions. The identity of views produced by these political developments finally united them still closer in the peace front.

Today we are busy working out the details of the definitive long term arrangements which will assure the unity of the three powers. On this subject I can tell you now that we are actively working on the Turkish-British treaty of mutual assistance which will contain clauses regulating the cooperation of the two powers in various domains.

Gentlemen,

Gentlemen, war never could create a civilization. On the contrary, all civilizations are the fruit of a long period of peace. Slavery is born of war, liberty is born of peace and civilization is the work of free nations only.

In the present European civilization the small independent States have a part just as considerable as and perhaps more so than that of the larger States. To suppress them would be to hinder the march of civilization and of progress. That is not possible and those who think it possible are preparing for a bitter future.

In considering the daily progress of political events in the world one notices that the arms and munitions factories are engaged in feverish activity which it seems could not be possible unless war had already been declared. Diplomatic conversations have a sort of warlike character, newspapers, the radio and news agencies create an atmosphere of war. One may say that today the only elements which remain on a peace footing are the Armies, that is, those which would eventually be called upon actually to fight.

Let us wish that it will be possible to remove and to save peace from this troubled atmosphere which is stifling it.

Our friendship with the Soviets preserves all cordiality which it had during the first days which consecrated this friendship. Every international event has always found the two powers side by side and in the same ranks.

The visit of M. Potemkin to Ankara furnished a new occasion to demonstrate the cordiality of this friendship.

It afforded us an occasion to realize once more that without understanding, without previous conversations, the

two countries, in the presence of the same events, have the same reactions and the same thoughts. The Turkish Republic and the Soviet Republic, created at the same time from the midst of two different revolutions, are attached to each other with all the warmth and revolutionary ardor which animate them.

The Balkan Pact which unites the Balkan countries to each other will continue to serve peace in the Balkans with the same efficacity and the same authority. Our recent contacts and exchanges of views have clearly proved that to us.

Gentlemen,

In adhering to the groundwork of peace we have no other purpose but to consolidate peace and we have decided to maintain normal relations with all powers, including Germany and Italy.

We desire that all our interchanges, including cultural relations and friendly contacts in general, should continue as in the past.

However, it is certain that in order that these normal and friendly relations may be maintained, this decision and this desire must exist on both sides. This is a point to which we are giving all our attention.

Our exchanges with Italy continue as in the past. In Germany a certain hesitation seemed to appear at first. But little by little this uncertainty has disappeared. Today, with the exception of one matter only, no reason for complaint divides us. We hope that this matter likewise will be favorably settled in the very near future.

Rumors have been current that our Turkish students have been badly treated in Germany. These have proved to be incorrect.

Gentlemen, I repeat, our policy is that of peace for ourselves and peace for all, and I repeat it again, we are attached to peace with all our heart but to a peace which guarantees our honor and our security and maintains intact the engagements with which this honor and security are bound up.

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1175 dated August 4, 1939, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

COPY

SOURCE: THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, London, July 10, 1939.

From ARTHUR MERTON,
"Daily Telegraph" Special Correspondent.

After expressing to the President my deep appreciation of his kindness in breaking with tradition in according me an interview, I asked whether it would be correct to say this: While basically the régime which Atatürk established has remained the same, an attempt is now being made to give it a more democratic orientation.

The President replied that the régime had always had a democratic basis, as it was intended to be controlled by the people for the people.

It had been necessary to be somewhat firm from the beginning since the Republican régime was a complete break with the past. Such firmness was vital to build the nation of the future. But there had never been any coercion and legislation had always been applied through the National Assembly, which gave everything a constitutional cachet.

It had now become necessary and possible to adapt the régime to the new circumstances, and gradually the people would take a bigger share in government. Already there had been free elections and the recent introduction of an Opposition in the Chamber.

"I have been encouraged in my efforts by the manner in which the whole nation has responded to the gradual extension of liberties", the President said. "Both the people and the Press have shown commendable comprehension of the limits in which criticism and comment is permissible".

We next talked of the Hatay, formerly known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, recently ceded by France, on the borders of Syria. The President said there were special reasons why the Hatay had returned within the Turkish frontier. The Hatay had been an old question which had poisoned the relations with France and Syria.

"The settlement with France has happily placed our relations once again on a firm and solid basis", he said.

"It was wrong, however, to say that this presaged a new colonial policy. Good relations with neighbours on a basis of mutual confidence were more valuable and more necessary to Turkey than territorial aggrandisement. She had quite enough to occupy her within her present territorial limits for many a long year.

Colonies

Colonies had cost them dearly in the past, and would seriously interfere with the development of their resources and the strengthening of their position which was vital to their existence.

Discussing the recent Anglo-Turkish declaration of mutual assistance, the President said he felt that Turkey's strength was as important to Britain as Britain's strength was to Turkey. If Britain's position in the Mediterranean weakened, Turkey would suffer.

Since the aims of the two countries were identical, it is essential in their mutual interests that they stand together.

Turkey was most pleased, he said, to find that Britain had started compulsory military service because a strong British army was essential for the maintenance of the peace front.

The President had great hopes that the new relationship between Britain and Turkey would assist Turkey to transform her present precarious trading system into a free exchange of goods.

We inevitably talked of the situation in the Balkans. The President affirmed that Turkey would much like to see Bulgaria join the Balkan Entente, which comprises Turkey, Greece, Jugoslavia, and Rumania. Turkey had always worked for this end and she had not lost hope of Bulgaria's adherence.

Throughout the interview the President repeatedly expressed his esteem for Britain. He said he cherished the happiest recollection of his stay in England when, as Premier, he represented Turkey at the Coronation.

At the end of the interview he gave me the following message for transmission to the British people through THE DAILY TELEGRAPH:

> "I beg you to convey to the British people the affectionate greetings of the people of Turkey.
>
> "We are most happy to see the cordiality with which the British nation received the idea of an alliance with the Turkish Republic. I am especially grateful to the British Press for their warm support of the policy which has inspired the alliance.
>
> "The British nation will find a most loyal ally in the Turkish people whose feeling to the alliance is as sincere as is their intention to carry out the obligation undertaken.
>
> "The ancient friendship which existed between the two peoples has been preserved throughout difficult years. Its roots are deep down in the hearts of the Turkish people.

"We

"We look forward with confidence to the strengthening of friendship, enabling us to advance hand in hand for the mutual benefit of our two countries in every sphere and for the preservation of peace throughout the world".

---

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1175 dated August 4, 1939, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

COPY

Istanbul, June 19, 1939.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Non-delivery of Turkish Military Equipment Ordered from Germany.

PARTICIPANTS: Colonel Binns, of Baker & Co., Istanbul.

Mr. F. P. Latimer, Jr., American Consul, Istanbul.

PLACE AND DATE OF CONVERSATION: Bebek, June 15, 1939, at 9:00 p. m.

During a conversation regarding the effects on German-Turkish trade of the recent Anglo-Turkish Pact, Colonel Binns stated that he had learned from a very reliable source that in a despatch dated May 25, 1939, the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin had informed his Government that all of the seven or eight Turkish missions now in Germany for the purpose of buying or inspecting war materials and equipment ordered there had been given to understand, more or less abruptly, by the German firms with whom they were negotiating, that their presence was no longer required, as there would be no further work done on orders for the Turkish Government. The mission assigned to the Germania ship building yards, which have completed one submarine for Turkey and are building two or three others, was informed that there was no reason for it to return to work the next day, as Germany would not deliver the remaining

submarines

submarines under construction for Turkey. The commissions assigned to the establishments of Krupp, Heinkel, and Messerschmidt were given similar, though less definite, intimations.

Colonel Binns stated that a copy of the Turkish Ambassador's despatch was sent to the Turkish Under Secretary for Air, accompanied by a memorandum requesting a list of all the Turkish aviation orders placed in Germany. The list attached to this dossier showed a total of Ltqs. 20,800,000 worth of war materials ordered in Germany. Colonel Binns was not sure whether this total represented only aviation material or the total orders for all types of military equipment placed but unfilled in Germany.

In a recent adjudication for iron and steel products held by a Turkish Government ministry, Colonel Binns' firm, Baker and Co. (branch of United Africa Limited) was successful, as agent for a Polish manufacturer, in obtaining the contract for four separate lists of materials whereas it had expected to secure the contract for only one of the four lists. Baker and Co. knew that the German (Krupp) representative could offer lower prices on all but one of these lists. On leaving the room where the adjudication was held, Baker's man met the Krupp agent and asked him why he had not submitted bids. The Krupp agent in reply showed him a telegram from his principals stating that, since the material under adjudication was for a Government department, no tenders should be submitted.

F. P. L.

FPL:KOS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 5, 1939.

~~A-G Mr. Grady:~~
A-M Mr. Messersmith:
A-B Mr. Berle:
U Mr. Welles:
S Mr. Secretary:

Assistant Secretary of State
SEP 6 - 1939
MR. GRADY

According to the attached despatch ~~from Istanbul~~, Turkey's foreign policy is "Peace for us, peace for the World." Foreign Minister Saracoglu, at the closing session of the Grand National Assembly on July 8, 1939, after outlining Turkey's progress during the last 20 years, said: "No victory could have given us what a series of years of peace has bestowed upon us, and no man of courage could lightly resolve to see these magnificent achievements disappear in the flames of an armed struggle," but, "if some time an attempt were made to make us pay more dearly for this peace than what war would cost us, then one would see that we are ready also to show how fit we are for war and desirous of the victory which it promises."

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 12 1939
MR. WELLES

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 1 1939
MR. BERLE

President Inönü of Turkey, speaking on May 29th, at the opening of the Fifth Congress of the Republican Party, said that the present insecurity must end either in nations flying at each other's throats or in finding the road to peaceful collaboration. Turkey will welcome any solution calculated to restore international security, but the right of smaller countries to independence and free national

FW 767.00/87

NM

national existence must be fully recognized. "We do not accept, we shall never accept, the theory that the smaller groups of humanity are destined to be absorbed by the larger ones. The right of each nation conscious of its individual existence to form an independent state, assured of the safeguard of its integrity, must be consecrated as an inviolable law common to all humanity."

Both President Inönü and Foreign Minister Saracoglu said that Turkey's search for security had led her to form a common front with nations that share its principles and ideals. This explained Turkey's joining the Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Pact. Finally, events in Central Europe and particularly the invasion of Albania had convinced Turkey that her security could no longer be assured by following a policy of neutrality and the Turkish-British Declaration of Mutual assistance followed; this, he said, is to be followed by a definite long-term arrangement that will insure the unity of Turkey, Britain and France. (In this connection the Embassy at Istanbul felt that despite these optimistic statements Turkey seems to be marking time until the results of the Anglo-Franco-Russian talks were known.) President Inönü said that Turkey will not avoid other engagements that may be of assistance in insuring her security, and added that Turkey, deeply concerned over the security of her neighbors, will take all steps in her power to check any dangers that may

threaten

threaten them "because we are convinced that a little later these same dangers would threaten ourselves."

President Inönü declared that if, in spite of Turkey's wishes, a new struggle should break out, the Turkish nation, mindful of the duties conferred upon it by humanity and civilization, would take part, without hesitation and scornful of all dangers, side by side with the nations that have the same ideals and the same vital interests.

Speaking along traditional lines as regards Turkey's cordial relations with the Soviet Union, President Inönü said (May 29, 1939): "Each of these two countries has the most complete and the most direct interest in the security and welfare of the other." While Foreign Minister Saracoglu said (July 8, 1939): "Every international event has always found the two powers side by side in the same ranks; without understandings, without conversations, the two countries in the presence of the same events have the same reactions and the same thoughts." It will be interesting to observe how Turkey will reconcile this alleged unanimity of views with the subsequent Russian-German Agreement, particularly since, as will be noted below, Turkish-German relations are none too cordial.

The Embassy feels that Turkey's expressed desire to maintain "normal relations" with Italy and Germany is a more optimistic hope than the situation warrants. Germany

is

is not delivering the military supplies ordered by Turkey: of 24 long-range cannon ordered from Skoda, only 2 have been delivered and none of the 60 Messerschmidt planes ordered eight months ago has so far been delivered. Some seven or eight Turkish military missions in Germany to follow construction of military supplies, including submarines, have been told that their presence is no longer required as Germany will not deliver the remaining submarines and other material under construction for Turkey. Recently, the Krupp representative in Turkey received telegraphic instructions not to bid on Turkish Government orders for iron and steel products.

The Turkish Government is not renewing the contracts of a large number of German and Italian nationals employed in both military and civil establishments, making no distinction between Aryans and non-Aryans.

All foreigners are being forbidden access to certain areas, the Assistant German Military Attaché, a Secretary of the Italian Embassy, and a German Archaeologist are among those who have complained against the restriction placed on their movements.

Wallace Murray

NE: J.H. Keeley/GC

767.00/87

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

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Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Secretary, General Staff
G-1
G-3
G-4
War Plans Division
Statistics Branch
Budget & Legislative Pl. Br.
Adjutant General's Dept.
Army Industrial College
Army War College
Air Corps (Liaison Officer)
Cavalry
Chemical Warfare Service
Coast Artillery Corps
Command & General Staff School
Engineers
Field Artillery
Finance
Infantry
Inspector General's Dept.
Insular Affairs
Judge Advocate General's Dept.
Medical Dept.
Militia Bureau
Office of Naval Intelligence
Ordnance Dept.
Quartermaster Corps
Signal Corps
Executive for Reserve Affairs

State Dept.:
- European Affairs
- Near Eastern Affairs
- American Republics
- Far Eastern Affairs
- Office of Philippine Affairs

Commerce Dept.:
- Foreign & Domestic Commerce
- Automotive-Aeronautics Trade Division
- Transportation Division

Civil Aeronautics Authority

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For your information and disposition
Note and return
Note and send to

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Istanbul, Turkey,

August 21, 1939.

No. 1183

Subject: Military Convention between Turkey, France and Great Britain.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1939 SEP 6 AM 11 42
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A.M.
SEP 23 1939
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

767.00/88

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the paragraph relative to the visit of the French Military Mission to Turkey and the military staff discussions proceeding between Turkey, France, and Great Britain, contained in my despatch No. 1175 of August 4, 1939, entitled "Turkish Foreign Relations and Policies", and to invite the Department's attention to the Military Attaché's G-2 Report No. 7087 of August 21, 1939, in which are set forth the principal points upon which agreement was

reached

FILED
SEP 26 1939
NM

reached in the discussions between the Turkish General Staff and the French Military Mission in which the British Military Attaché participated. It will be observed that it is proposed to conclude a tripartite military convention between Turkey, France, and Great Britain.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

711/710

RFK:mej

MIL. INTEL. DIV
6-4 MM 2257-C-166

DECLASSIFIED
ACO letter of 12-18-63 to NARS
NCRD: W. Neil Franklin 11-24-65

G-2 Report 6030

TURKEY (Combat-General)

Subject: Military Missions.
French Military Mission to Turkey.

Following the Franco-Turkish accord of mutual assistance in the Mediterranean area a French Military Mission, composed of General Huntziger, one time commander of troops in the Levant, Colonel Bourget, former Chief of Staff of Huntziger, Colonel Roque, representing the Air Ministry, Captain Guiot, Navy, and Captain Chabot, Aide-de-Camp, arrived in Istanbul on the morning of July 16, 1939, and departed the same day for Ankara for the purpose of conferring with the Turkish General Staff.

The mission was given a hearty welcome and daily publicity in the press. In an interview given news correspondents, General Huntziger is quoted as saying that this is his third visit to Turkey and on the present occasion he was here as a result of the agreement of mutual assistance between France and Turkey to discuss details regarding common action to be taken by the two armies in order to preserve peace.

The French, unlike the British, preferred to confine their activities to staff conferences and did not visit the critical areas. The British mission did both with only a fair amount of success. (See report No. 7080, I.G.No.6030, July 25, 1939).

Lieutenant Colonel Ross, British Military Attache and member of the British Military Mission which spent about three weeks in Turkey during the month of June, accompanied the French Mission to Ankara in an unofficial capacity.

According to Ross the Turkish Chief of Staff insisted that Ross be present at the conferences between the French and the Turks. A check on this statement from an unquestionable source proves it to be incorrect and that Ross's presence was due to the insistence of the French Mission. A few days after the first conference Ross received from the British War Office approval of his request to act in an official role.

Results of the Conferences.

As a result of the conferences a tripartite military convention between France, England and Turkey was drawn up and is now being studied by the respective War Offices. After some slight modifications it will undoubtedly be signed.

Following are the principal points:

1. Mutual military assistance in the event of any conflict involving the Mediterranean area.

767.00/89

From: M.A. Istanbul Report No. 7067 August 21, 1939.

2. France and England agree to furnish air assistance to Turkey upon the outbreak of hostilities.

3. Supplying Turkey immediately with certain armament and military equipment.

4. French and British fleets will be permitted to base at Izmir.

5. Recognition by France and England of the importance of defending the Thracian frontier. To furnish assistance in this area for the protection of the Dardanelles.

6. The French to send an expeditionary force from Syria of two divisions to the Grecian-Bulgarian frontier immediately upon the beginning of hostilities.

7. In the event of war with Italy, to assist Turkey in operations in the Dodecanese area.

8. The French and British fleets to assist in defense of the Dardanelles and Izmir areas.

After spending about eleven days in Ankara and Istanbul, the mission departed for Paris.

The French Ambassador and the Military Attache have personally expressed to me their gratification over the success of the mission.

Comments.

While the British Mission was carefully avoided by the Turkish Chief of Staff, the very opposite was true during the French visit. The Chief of Staff not only personally received the mission, but also entertained them and attended some of the conferences.

The Turks admire, respect and have great confidence in the British Navy and Air Force and the French Army.

Sources of Information: British and French Military and Air Attaches.

WALTER L. KLUSS,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.



DECLASSIFIED
AGO letter of 12-18-63 to NARS
NCRD: W. Neil Franklin 11-24-69

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

**SUBJECT**

Present position of Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean countries.

767.00/90

**For the original paper from which reference is taken**

**See** Memo.
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

**Dated** Sept 26, 1939 **From / To** State Department-Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

**File No.** 741.67/145

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

elh

767.00

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA

GRAY

ANKARA

FROM

Dated November 1, 1939

Received 9:25 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 2 1939
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State

Washington

138, November 1, 7 p.m.

The following are the more significant passages slightly condensed relating to Turkish foreign policy in the President's address on the opening of the new session of the Assembly today:

"The treaty signed on October 19 while not being directed against any country aims at insuring our security and at the same time helps forward international peace and confidence at least in those areas where our own influence can be exercised. The most effective measure which Turkey could take as well as her supreme duty in the cause of peace was to define her attitude beforehand with clearness and sincerity. By this treaty we pursue our aim of preventing any extension and further development of the tragedy of war and of creating an oasis of security in a Europe which is struggling against the horror of the present conflict. The application of the treaty is conditional on attempts being made to thwart these legitimate aims. Failing such an eventuality

our

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our bonds with the allies and our cooperation with them towards a common ideal will in no way prejudice our normal and friendly relations with other states, our duty towards our nation makes us hope with all sincerity for our country to remain tomorrow as well as today out of the sphere of war provided always that our security is not endangered or our obligations violated. Our Foreign Minister has taken part in the meetings and negotiations at Moscow lasting over a period of nearly three weeks. We had hoped that these negotiations would lead to an agreement reflecting a stage even friendlier than is the case at present in our relations with our long standing friend the Soviet Union. To achieve this aim we made every effort in our power and for a while we were convinced that we had succeeded. However, we failed this time to achieve this aim which we believed to be consonant with the interests of the other party as well as with our own. Nevertheless as you know the friendship which links our two countries rests on a solid basis. The circumstances and the obstacles arising from the temporary necessities of the present time must not be allowed to impair this friendship."

MAC MURRAY

RR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A-M
1940 JAN 31 PM 3 35

December 21, 1939.

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

NE-Mr. Murray:

I have read with much interest the memorandum on "Turkey's International Political Commitments", of which you were good enough to send me a mimeographed copy, and which I will retain in my files. It is a very useful piece of work and one which will be very helpful, I am sure, to the Department.

G.S.M.

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JAN 31 1940

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 5 - 1940
NOTED

December 18, 1939

S

Mr. Secretary:

In a memorandum dated December 15, 1939 I mentioned that we were occupied in preparing an exhaustive report on "Turkey's International Political Commitments".

That study has now been completed and a copy is attached.

Wallace Murray

Copies to:
U
A-M
A-B

NE JRC/MS

767.00/93

FEB 17 1940

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U - LIAISON OFFICE

December 27, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

The Division of Near Eastern Affairs felt that the attached study might be of interest. It need not be returned, but should of course be treated as a strictly confidential document.

Selden Chapin
Liaison Officer

("Turkey's International Political Commitments")

967.00

U-L:SC:BAB

767.00/93

PS/BA

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

December 27, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

The Division of Near Eastern Affairs felt that the attached study might be of interest. It need not be returned, but should of course be treated as a strictly confidential document.

Selden Chapin
Liaison Officer

"Turkey's International
Political Commitments"

U-L:SC:BAB

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

SUBJECT "Turkey's International Political Commitments". Acknowledges receipt of memorandum entitled - and comments on same.

767.00/94

94

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Despatch #3760
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Feb. 2, 1940 From / To Greece (MacVeagh)

File No. 741.6711/51

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

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DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept 27, 1958
NCR by Magnuson date 7-24-70

MAR 31 1940
2075-322
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**TURKEY**

**COMMENTS ON CURRENT EVENTS**

**February 15, 1940**

**(No. 17)**

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1. Turkey's Attitude Towards Russia.
2. Russian Troops on Turkish Frontier.
3. Current Military Situation in the Near East.

MAR 26 1940
COMMUNICATIONS AND
767.00/95

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1. Turkey's Attitude Towards Russia.

From numerous sources I have received reports that there are a number of Turks, both in and out of the army, advocating a more aggressive attitude towards Russia with a view to getting back lost territory in which Turks still reside. This group, though greatly in the minority at the present time, is nevertheless growing, particularly since the loss of Soviet prestige. Territorial ambitions in this direction are being somewhat encouraged by the French, but the British show no enthusiasm. Russia and Germany are attempting to divert attention from this field in favor of Iraq and Palestine.

Opposing any expansion are the conservatives and the old school of politicians who are still faithful to the doctrines of Kemal, which are: that post war frontiers become inviolable and for the Turkish people to live within these frontiers as a vigorous force free from Imperialistic dreams; peace with Russia; and no minorities. Kemal's teaching that the weakness of the Ottoman Empire was due principally to the incorporation of non-Turkish peoples will undoubtedly have sufficient weight to counter Russian and German propaganda in an expansion to the south.

It is believed that if the British and French gave greater encouragement to a move on Russia that the opposition of the conservatives would be overcome. The Baku oil fields would make a tempting prize and many of the Turks like to toy with the idea.

Many Turks are now of the opinion that they joined with England and France at a bargain price. They feel that the loans and the treaty guarantees could have been made more advantageous to Turkey.

FILED
MAR 29 1940

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From: M.A. Istanbul Report No. 7154 February 15, 1940.

2. Russian Troops on Turkish Frontier.

The Turkish General Staff and the British Military Attaché have information that Russian activities in the Caucasus show no indication of preparations for an attack on Turkey. Troops in this area are engaged in constructing defensive field fortifications. The force is composed of five infantry divisions, one cavalry division, one motorized division and one mechanized division.

Reports from other sources are that there is considerable dissatisfaction among the Soviet troops and deserters who have crossed into Turkey are refusing to return.

.....

3. Current Military Situation in the Near East.

In a conversation with the British Assistant Military Attaché on February 18th, regarding the strength and composition of the New Zealand and Australian troops which recently arrived in the Near East, he assured me that at present his office had no information on the subject, but he was of the opinion that they were only advance elements of one or possibly two divisions.

With reference to Par. 5 of my Current Events Report No. 16 of February 1, 1940, pertaining to the transfer of cavalry regiments to the Near East, this information has been confirmed, but the British state they are intended only for security purposes and will not form part of any expeditionary force which may be necessary.

The British Military Attaché, Brigadier General Allen C. Arnold, with whom I am on intimate terms, assured me that the concentration of troops in Egypt, Palestine and Syria is intended only as a precautionary measure and that they do not intend provoking a front in the Near East.

.....

WALTER L. KLUSS,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attaché.

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

SUBJECT Development of Turkey's foreign policy in view of the present increase of tension in the Balkan area.

Reports-

mr

767.00/96

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Tel. #143, 4 pm
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Aug. 30, 1940 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 770.00/823

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

## SUBJECT

Press dispute over Turkey's foreign policy; comments on -

M

767.00/97

For the original paper from which reference is taken

97

See Despatch #1523
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Aug. 7, 1940 From / To ///// Turkey, MacMurray

File No. 867.91/9

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EH

FROM

GRAY

Ankara

Dated January 7, 1941

Rec'd 10:46 p.m.

RAY

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 8 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

7, January 7, 5 p.m.

On the occasion of its adjournment for a two months' recess the Prime Minister yesterday made to the Assembly an address including the following comments.

"Our external policy follows the established lines that you know. I may say that the wisdom of the line of conduct that you have adopted for the safety of the nation and of the country has been confirmed afresh by these developments and that the principle of security which constituted our sole aim has given good results by reason of the conscious steadiness of our policy, wholly faithful and bound to our alliances.

I may assure you once again that our loyal policy which has received your approval and which involves no element that should inconvenience or disquiet any country whatsoever will follow the same path and I hope will not fail to give, in the future, as in the past, happy results for the well being of our nation".

MACMURRAY

EMB

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PS/FE
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FILED
JAN 11 1941

# CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

## NOTE

SUBJECT Reaction of Turkish Government to Bulgarian King's visit to Berchtesgaden.

Reports concerning the,-

FLH

767.00/99

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See Desp # 1613
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated Nov. 30, 1940 From / To Turkey (MacMurray)

File No. 867.00/3104

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—1540

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 3 1941
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File
FEB 1 - 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

To: Moscow
Ankara
Paris
London and
Athens

Drafted Nov. 26/39

November 20, 1939.

# TURKISH INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMITMENTS

767.00C

## Introduction

Turkey's important international position proceeds from two principal factors, namely, that it is at once both a bridge between Europe and Asia and that it commands a series of waterways of great strategic importance. These waterways, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus, are commonly known as the Straits.

Ever since the expansion of Russia to the shores of the Black Sea in the eighteenth century, Turkey's position as the guardian of the Straits controlling Russian communications between the Black and Mediterranean Seas has been one of the main preoccupations of Russian foreign policy. The Eastern question developed long before the first World War, out of the reactions of the Great Powers to Russia's efforts to dominate or control Constantinople and the Straits.

Short of dominating the Straits, Russia desired to obtain, in time of war as well as in time of peace,

freedom

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FEB 3 1941

freedom of passage for its war vessels through those waterways while denying such freedom of passage to other powers.

In view of the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean to the defense of India, British policy was directed before 1914 to maintaining Turkish possession of the Straits and to denying the use of the Straits to Russian warships while making them available for use of other nations. As between an open and closed regime Russia generally preferred the former and Great Britain the latter.

During the early months of the World War, Great Britain was compelled to agree to the acquisition by Russia of Constantinople in the event of Allied victory. With the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, and the repudiation of annexations by the Soviet Union, that agreement became a dead letter.

The relinquishment of Russian pressure upon Constantinople and the Straits and the common pressure exerted against both the Kemalist Government of Turkey and the Bolshevik Government of Russia by the Western

Powers

Powers drew Turkey and Russia together after 1920.

Russian activities to stir up world revolution were side-tracked in 1921 under the immediate need of internal reconstruction. Soviet aims were directed first of all to the defense of Russia and with that end in view a series of treaties of friendship was concluded with its immediate neighbors, beginning with Persia, February 26, 1921, Afghanistan February 28, 1921 and Turkey March 18, 1921. Along with these treaties Moscow sought to promote a peace front in the Middle East against possible Allied aggression. This peace front took the form of a Turko-Afghan Treaty signed at Moscow March 1, 1921, a Perso-Afghan Treaty at Tehran on June 2, 1921 and a Turko-Persian Treaty in 1923.

761.6711

Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 1921

The Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, March 16, 1921 was the first major international agreement negotiated by the Kemalist Government of Turkey and is still in force. Article 1 provides that neither party shall "recognize any treaty of peace or other international act which may be imposed upon the other party". (This provision was prompted principally from Turkey's desire to void the Treaty of Sèvres). Article 8 provides that the

the two parties "agree not to allow the formation or sojourn on their territories of organizations or groups pretending to assume the role of government of the other country or of part of its territory or the sejourn of groups having for their purpose enmity against the other country".

These were the political commitments undertaken by Turkey. One other provision is historically noteworthy, namely, Article 5, which provided that "with a view to insuring the opening and freedom of passage of the Straits to commercial transactions of all peoples, the two Contracting Parties agree to delegate the drafting of a definitive international statute on the Black Sea and the Straits to a future conference composed of delegates of the riverain States, it being understood, however, that the consequent decisions should not be incompatible with the full sovereignty of Turkey and the security of Constantinople". The emphasis upon commercial transactions is noteworthy, as is also the limitation of the contemplated conference to delegates of the riverain States, that is to say, in this case the Soviet Union, Turkey, Rumania and Bulgaria.

<u>The Lausanne Conference and the Straits Convention of 1923</u>

Turkish-Russian relations suffered their first rift at Lausanne in 1923, incident to the drafting of a new

regime

regime for the Straits when Turkey conceded to Great Britain's desire for freedom of passage for war vessels through the Straits.

With the end of the first World War, the positions of Great Britain and Russia toward the Straits were thus reversed. Russia was weak and vulnerable and, accordingly, Soviet policy advocated the closing of the Straits to war ships, both in time of peace, as well as in war. From 1453 to 1774, when Russia emerged on the Black Sea, Turkey had exercised the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire", excluding foreign war ships from the Straits. During that period, Turkish control of the Straits had been absolute. From 1774 to 1918 the degree of Turkish control varied with the direction of the diplomatic winds of the time. From 1918 to 1923 the Straits had been in the control of the Principal Allied Powers.

Now the Allies proposed that the Straits should be opened in peace or war to a limited number of war ships belonging to powers not at war with Turkey while Soviet Russia proposed that the Straits should be closed at all times and in all circumstances to warships. The Soviet Union wished to close the Straits by reason of a fear of the aggression of others. The Allies, no longer apprehensive of Russia's military or naval strength, were

quite

quite prepared to permit freedom of passage of the Straits for war vessels, including the right of egress for Russian vessels, provided Allied war vessels were admitted into the Straits. The question in its simplest essence was whether the Black Sea should be a closed lake so far as naval power was concerned. In the end Great Britain largely had its way that the Black Sea should be an open lake and that the Straits should be open to the war vessels of all nations. As a concession, Turkey was granted virtual freedom of action when Turkey should be at war, but the Straits were to be demilitarized and an International Straits Convention was set up subordinate to the League of Nations to oversee the fulfillment of Turkish obligations. The convention thus was to a considerable extent a fulfillment of the twelfth of Wilson's fourteen points, which provided that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantee".

Turkish-Russian Treaty of 1925

The Locarno negotiations, which detached Germany from its eastern orientation toward Russia, induced the Soviet Union to take steps toward the strengthening of its relations with Turkey. The moment chosen was that

when

when the Council of the League had given its award of Mosul to Iraq. On the following day, December 17, 1925, Rushti Bey and Chicherin signed in Paris a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, subsequently extended on November 7, 1935 with the related protocols for a period of ten years.

Article 1 embodies a reciprocal obligation of the two parties to maintain neutrality toward the other "in case of military action undertaken by one or more powers against the other party".

The two parties further agreed to abstain from any aggression against the other, "in its participation in any alliance or agreement of a political character with one or more third powers directed against the other contracting party or in any alliance or agreement with one or more third parties directed against the naval or military security of the other (Article 2).

A protocol of December 17, 1929 provided that:

> "The two contracting parties further undertake not to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of political agreements with states contiguous by land or sea to the other party without notifying the latter, nor shall they conclude such agreements without securing the consent of the other contracting parties."

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The protocol contained a reservation, however, that "instruments which aim at the establishment or maintenance of normal relations with such contiguous states and which will be made public are not subject to the above stipulations."

Countries contiguous by land to the Soviet Union, other than Turkey, are the following: Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, (Germany, Lithuania and Hungary), Rumania, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Japan. Those contiguous by sea to the Soviet Union are Bulgaria, the United States (Alaska) and presumably Norway. These are all countries presumably with which Turkey may not conclude political agreements other than those concerned with normal relations, such as consular conventions, treaties of establishment, commerce and navigation, et cetera, without the consent of the U.S.S.R. That Turkey fully realizes its obligations in this regard was evidenced by a telegram dated February 1, 1939 from the American Legation at Helsinki reporting the Turkish observations to Finland in respect of that country's negotiations with members of the League concerning the Aland Islands. The Turkish Government was stated to have informed Finland of its obligations to consult the Soviet Union before reaching an understanding regarding

any

any question involving a neighboring state of the Soviet Union.

Countries contiguous by land with Turkey, other than the U.S.S.R. are Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Those contiguous by sea are Rumania, and, it might be contended, also Italy, by reason of the Dodecanese Islands, and Great Britain, by reason of Cyprus. The answer to this contention, however, would presumably be that any limitation placed upon the treaty-making powers of the Soviet Union by the protocol of 1929 extended, when thus interpreted, only to those treaties made concerning the Dodecanese Islands and Cyprus, respectively. It may be presumed that generally speaking the protocol would probably be interpreted as only extending to a limitation placed upon the U.S.S.R. not to conclude special political agreements with Greece, Syria, Iran and Iraq without the consent of Turkey.

It will be seen that nothing in the protocol necessitates the seeking of Soviet consent to the conclusion of a special political agreement between Turkey and Great Britain or Turkey and France, since neither of those countries is contiguous by land or sea to the U.S.S.R. in the ordinary meaning of those words. Nor is there anything in the protocol which necessitates the seeking

of

of Turkish consent to the conclusion of a special political agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Germany or between the U.S.S.R. and any of the Baltic or Scandinavian countries, since none of those countries is contiguous by land or sea with Turkey. However, it is important to note that the protocol does preclude the conclusion of a special political agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Iran, Iraq, Greece, Bulgaria or Rumania, without the consent of Turkey. As regards the Middle East, the protocol would appear to offer some obstacle to possible Soviet encroachments in that direction through political agreements with Iran or Iraq embodying servitudes upon those countries. The fact that the Soviet Union is not estopped in this regard in the case of Afghanistan by its treaty relations with Turkey might suggest that any forward political policy on the part of the Soviet Union in the Middle East may be directed first of all in the direction of Afghanistan, although even there some weight is interposed to such a development by the Saadabad Pact providing for consultation between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in "all conflicts of an international character which affect their common interests".

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Turkish-Greek Relations

The relations between Turkey and Greece underwent their most radical transformation in centuries with the conclusion

conclusion in 1930 of a Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, marking the beginning of a Turkish-Greek rapprochement, which has continued ever since. The treaty is particularly important as representing the first contractual manifestation against revisionism in the Balkans and in favor of the maintenance of the status quo.

The two parties engage mutually not to enter into any understanding of a political or economic order or in any combination directed against the other (Article 1). If one of the parties is the object of aggression, the other undertakes to remain neutral (Article 2). Other provisions of the treaty relate to conciliation and arbitration of disputes between the two Governments. The treaty was concluded for a period of five years and was renewed in 1935 for a like period.

By a further Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of September 14, 1933, concluded for a period of ten years, Turkey and Greece mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontiers (Article 1) and they agreed to consult together "on questions of an international character liable to be of interest to them" (Article 2).

As Turkey and Greece possess a common frontier only in Thrace, the mutual guarantee of their common frontier would extend only to that area.

Balkan Pact

The rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was soon followed by the conclusion of the Balkan Pact, with a view to maintaining the status quo throughout the Balkans. The pact concluded between the representatives of Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia was signed at Athens on February 9, 1934.

In the preamble the four signatories declared that they wished "to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Balkans" in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and were "firmly resolved to guarantee respect for existing contractual engagements and the maintenance of the established territorial order". They therefore guaranteed mutually "the security of all their Balkan frontiers" (Article 1), and undertook "to consult with each other on the measures to be taken in the face of eventualities capable of affecting their interests as defined by the present agreement". They also undertook "not to embark on any political action" in respect of any other Balkan state which was not a signatory of the

agreement

agreement "without previous mutual discussion, nor to assume any political obligation towards any other Balkan State without the consent of the other High Contracting Parties" (Article 2). The agreement was to come into force on signature. It was open to signature by the other Balkan countries (Bulgaria and Albania), whose adherence would be "the object of favourable examination by the contracting parties" (Article 3).

An additional protocol, the terms of which were not made public for some weeks after signature, defined the nature of the engagements into which the four states had entered in more precise terms. By Article 1 of the protocol, the signatories accepted the definition of the aggressor given in the conventions signed in London on the 3rd and 4th July 1933. The pact was declared not to be directed against any power. Its object was to guarantee Balkan frontiers against aggression by a Balkan state, and it would come into operation against a Balkan state which joined another power in committing an act of aggression upon a signatory (Articles 2 and 3). The signatories agreed to begin negotiations within six months for conventions in conformity with the objects of the pact (Article 4). They recognized that existing treaties remained binding upon them, and declared that the pact was

"not

"not in contradiction with previous obligations" (Articles 5 and 6). If any signatory state should commit an act of aggression against any other country, the relations of that state with the other signatories would cease to be governed by the terms of the pact (Article 7). The maintenance of existing territorial arrangements was declared to be incumbent upon the signatories. The pact could be denounced after two years, and if not so denounced, and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, it would remain in force for another five years. Thereafter, failing denunciation, it would automatically continue in force for seven years more (Article 8).

In the Survey of International Affairs, 1934 (pages 527-528), it is observed:

> "While the negotiations which preceded the signature of the pact were still in progress, a question regarding the implications of the agreement had been raised by the Soviet Government with the Turkish Government. The Soviet Ambassador in Angora had drawn attention to the possibility that in the event of hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania, Bulgaria might be drawn in on the Russian side, in which case Turkey, by the terms

of

of the pact, would be obliged to support Rumania against Bulgaria and therefore against Russia. Such action on Turkey's part, it was pointed out, would contravene the Turco-Russian treaty of neutrality of 1925. This difficulty was overcome by a written declaration from the Rumanian Government that they would expect no aid from Turkey in the event of a conflict with the U.S.S.R. After the signature of the pact, when its terms were made public, the Greek opposition, led by Monsieur Venizelos, launched an attack on the Government on the ground that they had not taken similar precautions to insure that Greece would not become involved in war with Italy as a result of the obligations which she had undertaken in regard to the protection of Jugoslavia's frontiers. Under this pressure, the Greek Government asked for and received assurances from the other three Governments that in no circumstances would the application of the pact involve Greece in hostilities with a greater Power.

. . . . . .

"The effect of these reservations was virtually to limit the guarantee to the frontiers between

the

the four signatory states and Bulgaria."

It is to be noted that, according to the terms of Article 2 of the Balkan Pact, engaging the contracting parties not to assume any political obligations toward any other Balkan State without the consent of the parties, it might be contended that the consent of Rumania, Greece and Yugoslavia, was necessary to the conclusion by Turkey of the Tripartite Treaty of October 19, 1939 in as much as Turkey, in Article 3 of that Treaty assumed political obligations with respect to Rumania and Greece.*

A number of interesting interpretations were given the Balkan Pact in connection with the extended diplomatic maneuvering which took place on the eve of the world crisis of 1939. Thus, the American Ambassador at Ankara informed the Department in a telegram no. 20, March 27, 1939, file 740.00/923, that the British Government had inquired of the Turkish Government whether it would support Rumania if attacked by Germany and that the Turkish reply was said to have been to the effect that its commitments under the Balkan Pact obligated it only to assist Rumania if the latter was attacked upon its land frontier by Bulgaria. The Turkish reply was said to have added that if the British inquiry contemplated action concerning a German attack on

Rumania

*This was not, however, the view of Turkey (see Belgrade Legation's telegram no. 146 of May 23, 1939, 7 p.m., file 741.67/91) The fact is, nevertheless that Yugoslavia is reported to have protested the conclusion of the Treaty (see Belgrade Legation's telegram no. 327 of October 31, 1939, 1 p.m. file 741.6711/31). although it is not known whether the protest was based on Article 2 of the Balkan Pact or not.

Rumania supported by Bulgaria, Turkey could not commit itself until informed as to the amount of support which Great Britain and France might be in a position to accord. In a further telegram, no. 35, April 12, 1939, file 765.75/486, from the American Ambassador at Ankara, it was stated that Turkey was prepared to fulfill its obligations under the Balkan Pact but it was not prepared to give military support to another Balkan Pact State (other than Greece, with which Turkey enjoys particular treaty relations,) which might be attacked by non-Balkan States without the involvement of Bulgaria.

In a telegram, no. 854 of November 2, 1939, from the American Ambassador at Moscow, the Turkish Ambassador was stated to have informed the American Ambassador that prior to the Soviet-Turkish negotiations the Soviet Government had been in negotiation with Bulgaria, whereby Bulgaria would receive the Dobrudja and the Soviet Union Bessarabia, as well as a naval base on the Bulgarian coast in connection with joint action by the Soviet Government and Bulgaria against Rumania. The Soviet authorities were stated to have inquired of the Turkish Foreign Minister as to the Turkish attitude in the event of a Bulgarian move against Rumania and the

Foreign

Foreign Minister was said to have informed the Soviet authorities categorically that Turkey would consider itself bound by the Balkan Pact and would immediately come to Rumania's assistance. The Turkish Ambassador was said to have added to the American Ambassador however that Turkey did not consider itself bound to interfere on Rumania's behalf unless Bulgaria attempted to seize the Dobrudja. (See also page 29.)

Montreux Straits Convention of July 20, 1936

The Montreux Straits Convention signed by Great Britain, France, Japan, U.S.S.R., Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey on July 20, 1936 and adhered to by Italy on May 2, 1938, represented the first formal revision of a post-war peace treaty by negotiation.

The convention, which replaced the regime of the Straits established in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, was made possible by the eagerness of the powers most interested, namely, Great Britain and Russia, to placate a power, Turkey, which was friendly to both.

The preliminary discussions were concerned with Turkey's desire to obtain freedom from the demilitarization clauses of the convention of 1923. Soviet Russia, however,

however, interjected the question of a general revision of that convention which had been concluded when Russia was at the nadir of its international position.

It has been said that in freeing Turkey of the demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne Convention and in restoring to Turkey primary control of the Straits, such as it had possessed before the war, the Montreux Convention marked the recognition of the new status of Turkey in the community of nations. At the same time the Soviet Union gained rights through the Montreux Convention such as pre-war Russia never possessed, namely, freedom of passage into and out of the Mediterranean for its Black Sea fleet except when Turkey was at war, when such passage was in the discretion of Turkey.

In the Survey of International Affairs, 1936, it is observed that "if Russia was principally concerned with the question of her own security in the Black Sea, she was also concerned with another factor in her security system, namely, her membership in the League of Nations, and, in particular, her alliance with France, without which she might once again find herself in the dangerous position of isolation which she had learned to dread in the years immediately after the war of 1914-18"

(p. 623).

(p. 623). Hence Article 19 of the convention, to be discussed later.

Non-Black Sea Powers, in Time of Peace (Articles 10-18)

The convention provides that in time of peace non-Black Sea Powers, that is to say, powers other than Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria and Rumania, may send into the Black Sea only light surface war vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary war vessels. (In an annex light surface vessels are defined as of not more than 10,000 tons, carrying guns not exceeding eight inches, thus excluding the entry of German pocket battleships.) The maximum tonnage of war vessels sent into the Black Sea shall not exceed 15,000 tons at any one time nor consist of more than nine units. Moreover, the total tonnage of all non-Black Sea Powers in the Black Sea shall not exceed 30,000 tons unless the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea Power shall be increased by 10,000 tons, in which case the limit shall be increased correspondingly up to 45,000 tons. Of this maximum no one non-Black Sea Power shall possess more than two-thirds and individual war vessels may not remain in the Black Sea more than 21 days. Courtesy visits to a port of the Straits may be made at the invitation of the Turkish Government without any limitation as to the

tonnage

tonnage or composition of such forces.

Black Sea Powers in time of Peace

The only limitations placed upon the movement of war vessels of Black Sea Powers in time of peace are the following:

1. No more than nine units shall be moved at one time.

2. Capital ships of a tonnage greater than 15,000 shall pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

Warships of Non-Belligerent Powers in time of War, Turkey being Non-Belligerent

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The only limitations in respect of navigation through the Straits prescribed for warships of non-belligerent powers in time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, are those set forth above under the two preceding sections of this memorandum.

Accordingly, so long as Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria maintain their non-belligerency they may move their war vessels in and out of the Straits at will, subject only to the limitation that not more than nine units may be moved at one time and that capital ships of a tonnage greater than 15,000 must pass through the Straits singly.

Warships of Belligerents, Turkey being a Non-Belligerent (Article 19)

According to Article 19 of the Straits Convention, war vessels belonging to belligerent powers shall not pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations, under the Covenant of the League, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League and registered and published in conformity with Article 18 of the Covenant. In these exceptional cases, no limitations on the size or number of the vessels permitted passage are applicable nor are the other limitations included in Articles 10-18 of the Convention.

Therefore, vessels of war belonging to Great Britain, France, Poland and Germany, so long as they may remain belligerent, are unable to pass through the Straits except (1) in cases arising out of the rights and obligations of Turkey or of any of the Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations, under the Covenant of the League (such powers being Great Britain, France, U.S.S.R., Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece but not Japan or Italy, who

are

are Contracting Parties but not members of the League) and (2) in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Covenant.

Accordingly, German war vessels may not, under any circumstances, so long as Germany is belligerent, obtain the right of freedom of transit through the Straits as they do not fulfill the conditions of any of the exceptions noted above.

Moreover, in the event Russia becomes a belligerent it would be estopped by the Straits Convention from obtaining passage through the Straits for its war vessels except in cases arising out of its rights and obligations under the Covenant of the League, a most unlikely contingency at the present time.

However, the war vessels of Great Britain and France would have the right to free passage without any limitations in the case of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League* and registered and published in

accordance

* Various efforts were made in the past by the League to define precisely the means by which pacts of mutual assistance might be reconciled with the Covenant of the

(Cont'd.p.24)

accordance with Article 18 of the Covenant. If, as it appears, the Tripartite British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance of October 19, 1939, has been concluded within the framework of the Covenant, then Turkey, although not a belligerent, would have the right to grant to the war vessels of Great Britain and France freedom of passage of the Straits to permit those powers to go to the aid of Rumania in the event that State was a victim of aggression.

In Time of War, Turkey being a Belligerent (Article 20)

Under the terms of Article 20 of the Straits Convention, the passage of warships, in the event Turkey is a belligerent, is left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government and, under such circumstances, the provisions of Articles 10-18 governing the freedom of passage of war vessels shall not be applicable.

According to Article 21, Turkey may also exercise complete discretion regarding free passage of the Straits in case it considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war except that its decision may be overruled by

* (Cont'd. from p.23) League. The principal difference of opinion appears to have developed over whether such pacts were to be regarded as supplementary to or independent of the general obligation of the Covenant. It is believed that with the decline in the influence of the League the tendency will be to interpret "within the framework of the League" as being within the general spirit of the League.

by a two-thirds majority of the Council of the League of Nations and by a majority of the powers signatories of the convention.

General Observations Regarding Straits Convention

Shortly after the conclusion of the Montreux Straits Convention, questions began to be raised by jurists concerning the interpretation to be given the second paragraph of Article 19 of that convention (the League and mutual assistance obligation provisions). M. Fernand de Visscher, writing in the Revue de Droit International, third series, volume 17, 1936, pages 691-692, observed:

> "But if the basis for the obligations which Turkey may have relative to the passage of belligerent forces acting in the name of a pact of assistance must be sought for outside of the Convention, it remains necessary none-the-less to determine exactly the hypothesis under which such obligations may arise and under what conditions Turkey will be called upon to meet them. The expression 'a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey' is very vague in meaning. Must it be restricted to the case in which Turkey herself would

would have by this pact contracted an obligation of 'assistance'? Several hypotheses are possible. In the first case, Turkey, bound by such a pact, considers that one of the parties has actually been the victim of an unjust aggression and, fulfilling her obligations entirely, intervenes in its favor. In this case, we evidently depart from the general hypothesis covered by Article 19, that of war-time, as Turkey is not a belligerent. Article 20 alone is the one which finds application, an article which, taking into account the belligerency of Turkey, leaves the latter full liberty of decision, even with regard to ships belonging to neutral powers. It is hardly possible to allow that in formulating Article 19, the signatories to the Convention had in view that case of positive assistance on the part of Turkey, a case which manifestly comes under the following article and involves the application of an entirely different regime.

"It is much more reasonable to believe that they merely contemplated the case in which, without becoming a belligerent, Turkey would limit her intervention to granting free passage to belligerent

fleets

fleets bringing their assistance to the state which was the victim of an aggression.

"But such an attitude, I should like to observe, does not necessarily imply that Turkey has contracted obligations of assistance properly speaking. This might be imposed upon her by agreements of a much more restricted scope, connected, however, with the possible execution of such a pact. We may conceive, for example, that Turkey might guarantee the free passage of either the French or the Soviet fleet in case one of those powers should deem it its duty to render assistance to the other. The terms of paragraph 2, Article 19, are broad enough to include agreements of that nature; it suffices that Turkey should have contracted, by her adherence to a treaty of mutual assistance, certain 'engagements' intended to facilitate its execution. Besides, nothing would prevent these engagements being made <u>a posteriori</u> and simply reinforcing the efficacy of existing treaties.

The supreme importance of Articles 19 and 20, of course, is in the extent to which Turkey is made the arbiter of the right of passage for war vessels in time

of

of war. The importance of this arbitral power was never more strikingly brought out than in the diplomatic maneuvring on the part of the Soviet Union and the Allies in 1939 for Turkish participation in new treaty engagements by which Turkish control of the Straits would either be neutralized or cast in favor of the other contracting party or parties.

Thus, according to a telegram no. 669 of October 3, 1939 from the Embassy in Moscow, the object of a Turkish-Soviet treaty from the Soviet point of view was that of neutralizing the Black Sea and Balkan areas by providing for mutual assistance in case of an act of aggression in those areas. The Soviet Union desired an undertaking in such a treaty that Turkey would close the Straits to the (belligerent?) war vessels of any non-Black Sea power. The Soviet Union had no objections in the beginning to Turkey's fulfilling its obligations to Great Britain and France in the Eastern Mediterranean in the event Italy engaged in war but desired assurances that Turkey would remain neutral toward the Soviet Union even if engaged in war as an ally of Great Britain and France.

Similarly, the Embassy at London reported in its telegram no. 2046 of October 14, 1939, that according to

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the Foreign Office, the Soviet Union was seeking in its negotiations with Turkey to prevent any warship of a belligerent nation from entering the Black Sea irrespective of whether the Soviet Union was at war or not.

Subsequently, according to a telegram no. 765 of October 17, 1939 from the Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet Government had sought to obtain assurances of Turkish neutrality both in the event of the Soviet seizure of Bessarabia as well as in the event of a Bulgarian attempt to gain the Dobrudja. The Turkish Foreign Minister was reported to have informed Molotov that Turkey would go to Rumania's assistance if Bulgaria attempted to seize the Dobrudja but not if the Soviet Union took action with respect to Bessarabia. The reason given was that Turkey interpreted its obligations under the Balkan Pact to refer only to the frontiers between Balkan States. However, Molotov was informed that the Turkish Government would not commit itself in advance as to its course of action with respect to the Straits in the event the Soviet Union seized Bessarabia.

In the same telegram it was stated that the Turkish Government had consulted with the British and French Governments throughout the Turkish-Soviet negotiations and that Great Britain had taken the position that there would be

be no objection to Turkish neutrality in the case of Soviet aggression against Rumania provided the status of the Straits under the Montreux Convention remained unchanged.

It is clear from the foregoing the importance attached by both Great Britain and Turkey to the provisions of Article 19 of the Straits Convention, which would permit, in effect, British and French war vessels to enter the Black Sea to go to the relief of Rumania if that country was attacked even though Turkey might remain neutral in such a conflict.

Saadabad Pact

The first series of Middle Eastern Pacts after the first World War between the Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan was inspired by Moscow. The aim was to withdraw those States from the influence of the Western Powers and to make them a bulwark of defense.

By 1934, however, the Middle Eastern States were prepared to go their own way. According to a Tehran Legation's despatch of July 14, 1937, a multilateral pact between the Middle Eastern States was suggested to the Shah by Mustapha Kemal upon the former's visit to Turkey in 1934. The pact is said to have fitted in "with Turkey's ambition of fostering a growing sense of the

community

community of interest among the nations of the Middle East and thereby eliminating all those foreign influences and restraints which had in the past prevented closer cooperation and understanding between them."

The Treaty which became known as the Saadabad Pact was signed in Tehran on July 8, 1937 between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan. The pact was entitled formally a "Treaty of Non-Aggression". It also provided for consultation of the contracting parties "in all conflicts of an international character which affect their common interests". (Article III)

Tripartite Treaty of October 19, 1939: Its Background

Turkey joined the League of Nations on July 18, 1932 and Soviet Russia entered the League on September 18, 1934.

The events in Ethiopia in 1935-36 hastened the rapprochement between Great Britain and Turkey, the beginnings of which were signalized by the visit to Turkey of King Edward VIII in September 1936. The rapprochement was furthered by the dynamic behavior of Germany. Shortly after the Anschluss, the British Government extended, in May 1938, a credit of sixteen million pounds to Turkey. This was followed by the conclusion , at Germany's insistence, of an agreement between

between Turkey and Germany for a German credit to Turkey of Reichsmarks 150 million.

The movement toward a strengthening of the ties between Great Britain and Turkey and France and Turkey proceeded apace with the increasing threat of war between the Axis Powers and the Allies. Following the occupation of Prague by Germany in March 1939, and the Italian occupation of Albania on April 7, 1939, unilateral declarations were made on April 13, 1939 by Great Britain that, in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatened the independence of Greece or Rumania and which the Greek or Rumanian Governments respectively considered it vital to resist with its national forces, the British Government would feel itself bound at once to lend the Greek or Rumanian Government, as the case might be, all support in its power. Like unilateral declarations were made by France. The Italian occupation of Albania led directly to a joint declaration on the part of Great Britain and Turkey, read in the Parliaments of the respective countries on May 11, 1939, pledging the two countries to mutual assistance under certain circumstances.

There followed an agreement between Turkey and France for the cession of the Hatay to Turkey and a

joint

joint declaration on the part of France and Turkey in July 1939 similar to that made by Great Britain and Turkey on May 11.

At the same time, active negotiations were undertaken by the Governments concerned looking to the conclusion of a formal tripartite treaty of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and Turkey. When first proposed, the principal object of this treaty, as conceived by Great Britain and France was that of offsetting possible Italian aggression in the case of a general conflagration (London Embassy's telegram no. 2094 of October 19, 1939). In the end, the effects of the treaty became potentially even greater, constituting as it did a possible check to both German and Russian expansion in the Balkans and the Middle East and offering to Turkey a role as a possible bridge between the Allies on the one hand and Russia on the other.

The closing stages of the conclusion of a formal tripartite treaty between Turkey, Great Britain and France coincided with the opening of negotiations in Moscow between Turkey and Russia for a mutual assistance pact. At the beginning of these last-mentioned negotiations, Russia appears to have been reconciled to the contracting by Turkey of obligations to Great Britain

and

and France in the Eastern Mediterranean within the framework of the Straits Convention but as these negotiations proceeded, until they were broken off, the Soviet attitude appears to have shifted and to have been finally directed to the obtaining of a pledge from Turkey not to join in any combination hostile to the U.S.S.R. and also to a demand that Turkey agree to keep the Straits closed to all belligerents in war time. This shift in the Soviet attitude followed closely after the Soviet-German Agreement of August 25, 1939.

Thus, during the latter negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. sought, without success, to obtain a modification of Article 3 of the draft Tripartite Treaty so that if Great Britain and France were at war by reason of their guarantees to Greece and Rumania, Turkey would be obligated only "to consult" and not "to cooperate effectively" with the British and French Governments. Equally unsuccessful was the Soviet endeavor to introduce a provision in the treaty that, in the event of Russia's being at war with Great Britain and France, Turkey should agree to suspend all that treaty's obligations. However, even before the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of August 1939, Turkey had insisted on, and the British and French Governments had accepted, the modification of the draft

Tripartite

Tripartite Treaty providing that, in no case, should it impose on Turkey the obligation to engage in hostilities against the Soviet Union (London Embassy's telegram no. 2046 of October 14, 1939).

While at the beginning of the Turkish-Soviet negotiations it had been admitted by the Soviet Union that the Straits should continue to be governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, in subsequent meetings the Soviet Government raised other questions which departed from the basis of the original understanding. Thus, the Soviet Government attempted to insert a provision that the agreement should in no way bring the Soviet Union into conflict with Germany and it likewise attempted to obtain the modification of certain articles of the Montreux Convention, presumably articles 19 and 20, which would have had the effect of closing the Straits to the belligerent war vessels of any non-Black Sea Power under any conditions. In reporting this the American Embassy in Moscow, in its telegram no. 2765 of October 17, 1939 quoted the Turkish Foreign Minister as stating that Great Britain had endeavored to use the Turkish-Soviet negotiations to drive a wedge between Germany and Russia. The Turkish Foreign Minister also observed that the Turkish Government was willing to

conclude

conclude a mutual assistance pact with Russia but not to the extent of disturbing its relations with Great Britain and France.*

The importance of the Turkish position in all of these negotiations was brought out in a telegram from the Embassy in London, no. 776 of October 19, 1939, in which the Ambassador stated that one of his colleagues had described the most important result of the Turkish refusal to accede to the Soviet demands as the establishment of the fact that the Soviet Union alone could not exert a decisive influence in the Balkans.

If Turkey had agreed to close the Straits to the war vessels of non-Black Sea Powers under allcircumstances, both Great Britain and France would have been prevented from implementing their obligations to Rumania and Rumania would, in consequence, have been at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

Tripartite Agreement of October 19, 1939

This Agreement became definitive when Great Britain,

France

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* Three reasons were given by the Turkish Government in a formal communique issued on October 17, 1939 for the breakdown of the Turkish-Soviet negotiations. These were: (1) the Soviet proposals were incompatible with the obligations assumed by Turkey, with the knowledge of the Soviet Government, towards Great Britain and France; (2) the guarantees offered Turkey did not, from the point of view of its security, correspond to the obligations demanded of Turkey; and (3) the Soviet demands were not in conformity with the Turkish policy of not accepting any stipulations concerning the Straits other than general international obligations.
Molotov, in a speech of October 31, 1939 gave two reasons for the breakdown: "The U.S.S.R. considered, firstly, that the conclusion of such a pact could not induce it to actions which might draw it into armed conflict with Germany; secondly, that the U.S.S.R. should have a guarantee that in view of the war danger Turkey would not allow warships of non-Black Sea powers through the Bosporus to the Black Sea".

France and Turkey finally signed on October 19, 1939, a few days after the Turkish Foreign Minister returned to Ankara from Moscow following the breakdown of Soviet-Turkish negotiations. Article 1 of the Turkish Agreement concluded for a period of fifteen years, provides that Great Britain and France will lend Turkey "all aid and assistance in their power" in the event that Turkey is attacked by a European power. This article would take effect, therefore, if Turkey were attacked by Italy, Germany or the Soviet Union and irrespective of where the aggression took place. It is to be noted that the obligations are a unilateral undertaking by France and Great Britain and comprise no reciprocal undertaking by Turkey.

Article 2 provides that if an act of aggression by a European power leads to a war in the Mediterranean area, in which Great Britain and France are involved, Turkey will lend "all assistance" to Great Britain and France. This is obviously aimed against Italy and means that if Italy should join Germany, Turkey will join the Allies in attacking Italy. It is to be noted that the act of aggression may originate anywhere and against any state and that Turkey is obligated to act if the following three conditions are fulfilled:

(1)

(1) if the aggression is committed by a European power; (2) if the aggression leads to war in the Mediterranean; and (3) if France and Great Britain are involved in the resultant hostilities. The same clause obligates Great Britain and France to lend aid to Turkey under corresponding circumstances, namely, if an act of aggression by a European power leads to war in the Mediterranean area, in which Turkey is involved.

The most important article of the treaty, apart from Protocol 2, is Article 3, with which it is inseparably bound. Article 3 reads as follows:

> "So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Rumania by the respective declarations on the 13th of April 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom, and will lend them all aid and assistance in its power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees."

Protocol 2 provides as follows:

> "The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with

with U.S.S.R."

It is to be noted, in particular, that the protocol does not provide that Turkey will abstain from war with the U.S.S.R. under all circumstances but only that the treaty cannot obligate it to go to war with the Soviet Union. This protocol, therefore, may be regarded as a provision whereby Turkey is made, in effect, the sole judge of whether it should honor its commitments in any action involving the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly.

The most pertinent case, of course, is that in which the Soviet Union might become involved in hostilities with Rumania and Rumania should appeal for the implementation of British and French pledges to that country. Under such circumstances, Great Britain and France might request Turkey, under Article 3 of the Tripartite Treaty, to open the Straits to permit the passage of Allied war vessels into the Black Sea in accordance with Article 19 of the Straits Convention, even though Turkey might not become a belligerent.* Under these circumstances, it is entirely possible that the Soviet Union might notify Turkey that the opening of the Straits to Allied war vessels would constitute

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* It has been reported to the press that the Tripartite Treaty is being registered with the League of Nations, this no doubt for the purpose of making it conform strictly with the conditions prescribed in Article 19 of the Montreux Straits Convention.

constitute action "having as its effect or involving as its consequence an entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.".

Turkey might take one of two positions:

(1) Turkey might plead release from its obligations to open the Straits to the war vessels of the Allies on the score that such action would involve it in possible hostilities with the Soviet Union; or

(2) It might take the contrary position by representing to the Soviet Union that it was obligated to take such action by its pact with Great Britain and France but that in so acting it had no hostile intentions against the Soviet Union and that it did not consider the opening of the Straits need necessarily involve it in war with the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union had aggressive intentions on Turkey.

It would appear easier for Turkey to justify the first course rather than the second, although it might well be that Turkey would consider its own interests best served by adopting the second position. In any case, Turkey would seem to have successfully reserved to itself the right to be alone the judge of whether and how far it might cooperate with Great Britain and France in the Black Sea.

Article 4 of the Tripartite Treaty provides that, in the event of France and the United Kingdom being the victim of aggression by an European Power under circumstances other than those envisaged in Articles 2 and 3, Turkey will at least observe "a benevolent neutrality" toward France and the United Kingdom.

A word or two may be said in conclusion regarding possible future developments in the Near and Middle East in connection with Turkey's international political commitments.

Turkey's role is obviously that of maintaining equally good relations with the Soviet Union on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other. The positions of those two groups of Powers with respect to Turkey have become reversed since 1920; Turkey has now more to fear from the Soviet Union than from Great Britain and France.

The principal preoccupation of the Soviet Union since its birth in 1917 has been its defense against outside aggression. Since some time in the summer of 1939 the Soviet Union has decided to give renewed emphasis to propagation of the doctrine of the world revolution, presumably to the extent to which it may serve the defense policy of the Union.

Previous to the October Revolution in 1917 Russia needed to expand like other capitalist Powers in order to gain new markets and to obtain increased opportunities for the export of capital. Those economic mainsprings of action no longer obtain. The territorial expansion of the Soviet Union today or in the future would be based on strategic rather than economic considerations.

As to whether the Soviet Union will direct pressure for its strategic purposes upon the Balkans first or upon the Middle East (after it has settled its score with Finland) will depend upon the developing relations of the U.S.S.R. with Germany on the one hand and the Allies on the other as well as upon the exigencies of the moment. Turkey occupies a role of great importance in either eventuality by reason of its relation to the Balkan Entente, its command of the Straits and its relations with the Saadabad Powers.

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


## TURKEY-U.S.S.R.

Treaty of Friendship, March 16, 1921

Non-recognition of international acts imposed upon the other (Art. 1)

Prohibition of the sojourn of groups having for their purpose enmity against the other country (Art. 8)

Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, Dec. 17, 1925

Neutrality (Art. 1)
Non-aggression (Art. 2)
No alliance or agreement of a political character directed against the other or directed against the naval or military security of the other (Art. 2)
No political agreements with States contiguous to the other by land or sea, other than those concerned with "normal relations", shall be negotiated without notifying the other nor be concluded without obtaining the consent of the other (Protocol)

(AFGHANISTAN
TURKEY (IRAN — SAADABAD PACT — July 8,1937
(IRAQ

Non-aggression
Consultation

## TURKEY-GREECE

Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration, October 20, 1930

The two Governments engage themselves not to enter into any understanding of a political or economic order or into a combination directed against the other (Art. 1).
An engagement of neutrality if one of the Parties is the object of aggression (Art. 2)

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, September 14, 1933

Guarantee of the inviolability of the two countries' common frontiers (Art. 1)
Consultation concerning "all questions of an international character liable to be of interest to them" (Art. 2)

(GREECE
TURKEY (RUMANIA — BALKAN PACT — 9 February 1934
(YUGOSLAVIA

Mutual guarantee of the security of "all their Balkan frontiers" (Art. 1) (Reservations which relieved Turkey of the necessity of aiding Rumania in the event of a conflict with Russia virtually limited the guarantee to the frontiers between the members of the Pact and Bulgaria).
Consultation concerning interests affected by the Pact. No political action concerning Bulgaria and Albania without previous mutual discussion. No political obligations to be assumed toward any other Balkan State without the consent of the other members of the Pact.

(UNITED KINGDOM — TRIPARTITE TREATY
TURKEY (FRANCE — 19 October, 1939

Turkey will lend the United Kingdom and France "all aid and assistance in its power" in the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean involving the two Powers in question (Art 2).
So long as the guarantees given by the United Kingdom and France to Greece and Rumania remain in force, Turkey will "cooperate effectively" with the United Kingdom and France and "will lend them all aid and assistance in its power in the event of France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees" (Art 3).
In the event of an act of aggression being committed against the United Kingdom and France in all other circumstances Turkey will consult with those Powers and will observe at least "a benevolent neutrality" towards them (Art4).

"The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect or involving as its consequence entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R." (Protocol 2)

## TURKEY & U.S.S.R., RUMANIA, BULGARIA, GREECE, YUGOSLAVIA, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, JAPAN, ITALY

Straits Convention, July 20, 1936: Provisions re Passage War Vessels

1. In Time of Peace

(a) Non-Black Sea Powers

Light surface vessels (not more than 10,000 tons). Aggregate at any one time of not more than 15,000 tons nor more than 9 units. Total tonnage in Black Sea not to exceed 45,000 tons.

(b) Black Sea Powers

No more than 9 units to be moved at any one time. Capital ships of more than 15,000 tons to pass singly escorted by not more than two destroyers.

2. In Time of War, Turkey being Non-Belligerent

(a) Non-Belligerent Powers (see 1a and 1b above)
(b) Belligerent Powers

May not pass except in cases arising out of the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the Contracting Parties members of the League, under the Covenant, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League and published in conformity with Art. 18 of the Covenant.

3. In Time of War, Turkey being Belligerent

At the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Central File: Decimal File 767.00, Political Relations Of States, Relations; Bi-Lateral Treaties., Turkey And The World, July 12, 1930 - 12/15/39. July 12, 1930 - December 15, 1939. MS Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan States: Records of the U.S. Department of State, 1930-1944: Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations of Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan States, 1930-1939. National Archives (United States). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com%2Fapps%2Fdoc%2FSC5111386023%2FGDSC%3Fu%3Domni%26sid%3Dbookmark-GDSC. Accessed 21 June 2025.